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Abstract
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Muslims in the United States were victims
of increased surveillance by law enforcement on the basis of their religious identity, often
resulting in mistreatment and unjustified imprisonment. These biases against Muslims
and subsequent policy shifts have been pervasive and have had negative impacts on the
growing number of Muslims in the United States. The current study focuses on individual
differences that predict Islamophobia, including Social Dominance Orientation (SDO),
Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and Nationalism, as well as the specific types of
intergroup threat perceptions (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic) and subsequent
emotional reactions (e.g., anger, fear) that may drive these relationships. Participants (N =
603) completed a survey measuring SDO, RWA, Nationalism, threat perceptions,
Islamophobia, emotional reactions toward Muslims, and support for anti-Muslim policies.
Results demonstrated that higher levels of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism each
independently predicted more Islamophobia through increased realistic, symbolic, and
terroristic threat perceptions, respectively. Further, Islamophobia independently mediated
the relationships between each type of perceived threat and anti-Muslim policy support
(e.g., Muslim ban), such that those with higher levels of each type of perceived threat
were more likely to hold Islamophobic attitudes which predicted more support for antiMuslim policies. Together, these findings suggest that the susceptibility of individuals
high in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism to perceive Muslims as threatening influences their
support for policies related to those ideologies through the activation of perceived threats.
The emotional components of each type of threat perception and their relation to anti-

MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY
Muslim policy support, however, remain unclear. Potential avenues for improving our
understanding of the role of emotions in threat-based attitudes and behaviors are
discussed.
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Introduction
In 2015, Islam was identified as one of the world’s fastest growing religions, with
a global population that is expected to more than double by the year 2060 (Lipka &
Hackett, 2017). In the United States alone, the Muslim population will increase from 3.45
million in 2017 to about 8.1 million in 2050 and is expected to exceed the Jewish
population as the country’s second largest religious group by the year 2040 (Mohamed,
2018). Increases in the United States Muslim population are largely due to immigration,
with about 58% of Muslim adults having been born in another country and 18% having at
least one parent who immigrated to the United States (Pew Research Center, 2017).
Muslims who immigrate to the United States come from at least 77 different countries
(Pew Research Center, 2011) within several regions including 35% from South Asia,
25% from the Middle East, and 23% from other parts of Asia (Pew Research Center,
2017). No individual country accounts for more than 15% of the United States Muslim
immigrant population, however, indicating that American Muslims are a racially and
ethnically diverse group (Pew Research Center, 2017). Despite the growing prevalence of
Muslims in the United States, 43% of Americans reported feeling prejudiced attitudes
toward Muslims in 2010, a rate more than double that of any other major religious group
including Christians, Jews, and Buddhists (Morales, 2010). As recent developments in
globalization have resulted in religiously motivated conflicts, it is becoming increasingly
important to understand how intergroup bias impacts the daily lives of members of this
religious minority group in the United States.
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Anti-Muslim sentiment and discrimination are not restricted to the general public.
For example, 28% of Muslims in the United States report being looked at with suspicion,
and 34% report being singled out by airport security or other law enforcement (Pew
Research Center, 2011). Overall, 52% of Muslims in the United States feel that antiterrorism policies have led to Muslim profiling and increased surveillance. Moreover,
25% of Muslims in the United States indicate that mosques or Islamic centers in their
communities have been controversial and another 14% report local opposition to the
building of mosques and Islamic centers in their communities (Pew Research Center,
2011). Muslims in the United States have also become the victims of increased
surveillance by law enforcement following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (e.g., Blackwood
et al., 2016; Henderson et al., 2006; Keeling & Hughes, 2011; Meeropol, 2015). The
surveillance of Muslims and their communities includes increased questioning by police,
more arrests, and the insertion of undercover police officers into Muslim-American
communities and mosques (Ali, 2016; Henderson et al., 2006; Meeropol, 2015).
Coinciding with increases in scrutiny by law enforcement, a surge in hate crimes toward
Muslim Americans also occurred in the months following the 9/11 attacks (North et al.,
2014). This trend has continued to climb, such that in 2016, the number of assaults
against Muslims in the United States surpassed that of 2001 (Kishi, 2017), suggesting
that there is more to the story than a single event. Increases in anti-Muslim bias and
Islamophobia have negative consequences for Muslim communities in the United States,
including feeling less safe in public and reporting lower quality of life as a result of
perceived religious discrimination (Abu-Ras et al., 2018).
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In the years immediately following 9/11, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), and 18,000 state and local
police departments across the United States worked in conjunction to arrest individuals
who fit the profile of the attackers (Henderson et al., 2006; Meeropol, 2015). Specifically,
Muslims, Arabs, and those from Middle Eastern countries were routinely surveilled,
questioned, and detained by law enforcement, even in the absence of evidence of terrorist
activities. Law enforcement agencies were told to treat those arrested as if they were
terrorists or people who might know terrorists [Office of the Inspector General (OIG),
2003] even though this widespread abuse of Muslim and Arab communities resulted in
few terrorism-related prosecutions (Meeropol, 2015). For many, including 762
individuals detained in New York and New Jersey between the years 2001 and 2002,
immigration status alone was used as a justification for detainment until proven innocent
(OIG, 2003). Subsequently, many of these individuals were deported following
detainment, despite being cleared of all terrorism charges (Henderson et al., 2006;
Meeropol, 2015). In a speech given at the U.S. Conference of Mayors in October of 2001,
Attorney General Ashcroft outlined the department’s new focus on intercepting terrorism
through any possible legal means:
Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa – even by one
day – we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept
in custody as long as possible. We will use every available statute. We will seek
every prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and
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under the Constitution to protect life and enhance security for America (OIG,
2003, p. 12).
Under the guidelines laid out by the FBI and the Attorney General, the role of
state and local police officers was largely to use their street-level positions to surveil
Muslim and Arab communities and collect intelligence (Henderson et al., 2006;
Wasserman, 2015). For example, the New York Police Department (NYPD) created a
“Demographics Unit” which attempted to implant an informative in every mosque within
a 250-mile radius of New York City (Apuzzo & Goldman, 2011; Wasserman, 2015).
Such informants, often referred to as “mosque crawlers,” would monitor the activities of
Muslims and mosque services, regardless of any evidence of criminal or terrorist activity.
In addition to these activities, police officers reportedly monitored which businesses sold
halal products, which businesses closed their doors for daily prayer, and how often
Muslim students at universities prayed (Wasserman, 2015). Police officers also tracked
the racial and ethnic makeup of many of these communities. For example, one Muslim
client who sued the City of New York for the religious profiling and surveillance of
Muslims [Center for Constitutional Rights (CRC), 2018] was surveilled for operating a
grade school for Muslim girls. Police took note of details such that most of the girls
attending were African American, suggesting that officers were not only monitoring
Muslim communities but that they believed that their racial and ethnic identities were
relevant to terrorism-related investigations. Although the main goal of this police
surveillance was to detect any terrorism-related plans or activity, few terrorism-related
investigations or charges resulted from the widespread monitoring of Muslims and their

MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY

5

communities (Blackwood et al., 2016; Ramirez, 2012). Further, Muslims who were
eventually cleared of all charges and released from custody often experienced continued
surveillance by law enforcement in their communities (Ali, 2016; Keeling & Hughes,
2011).
In addition to continued surveillance by law enforcement, anti-Muslim bias has
persisted through the promotion of policies that restrict religious freedom and Muslim
immigration to the United States. For example, shortly after his election in 2016, thenPresident Trump signed an Executive Order that restricted immigration and travel from
seven Muslim-majority countries including Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Libya, and
Yemen (Trump, 2017a). This Executive Order purported to reduce terrorism through
restrictions on immigration and travel from majority Muslim nations to the United States.
Although this policy initially received support from up to 48% of United States
respondents (Collingwood et al., 2018), the policy quickly became controversial and was
ultimately revoked as a result of its implementation having violated existing court orders
(OIG, 2018). The Trump administration persisted by adding other countries to the
Executive Order that they considered a potential threat to the United States. Still, eight
out of the eleven countries included in the most recent version of the Executive Order
were Muslim-majority countries, bringing into question the role of perceived threat in
this immigration policy decision.
Biases against Muslims and subsequent policy shifts, such as state-sanctioned
surveillance, have been pervasive and have greatly harmed the growing number of
Muslims in the United States (Elsheikh et al., 2017; Meeropol, 2015). Existing social

MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY

6

psychological research presents an incomplete understanding of the relationship between
individual differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and subsequent emotional reactions
in the context of prejudice toward Muslims by only investigating one or a few of these
factors in isolation. Although informative, this research lacks a comprehensive
understanding of how these factors interact and is unable to assess the relative
contributions of different ideologies in bias against Muslims. The current study aimed to
address these gaps by 1) evaluating the roles of individual differences in ideology and
threat perceptions on prejudice and anti-Muslim policy support, 2) exploring the
emotional components of different types of threat perceptions regarding Muslims, and 3)
investigating emotional reactions as mediators in the relationship between threat
perceptions and support for anti-Muslim policies, focusing on police surveillance of
Muslims and Muslim communities.
The current study aimed to understand factors that predict and perpetuate
prejudice toward Muslims, as well as the implications of such bias for discriminatory
policies that result in increased surveillance and policing of Muslim and Middle Eastern
communities in the United States. After discussing the social context and experiences of
Muslims with Islamophobia in the United States, this paper will discuss several theories
relevant to understanding bias against Muslims and discriminatory policy support. First,
given commonly held stereotypes of Muslims as radical and dangerous, social
psychological theories of intergroup threat (Stephan et al., 2015) and the sociofunctional
approach to prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) can aid in understanding prejudice
toward Muslims. These theories suggest that perceptions of threat (i.e., symbolic threat,
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or threats to one’s values; realistic threat, or threats to one’s resources and power;
terroristic threat, or threats to one’s physical safety) underlie prejudice toward different
groups (e.g., religious, racial/ethnic; Stephan et al., 2015). Each specific threat then leads
to different emotional reactions, such as anger for realistic threats and distrust for
symbolic threats (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). These different emotional responses have
implications for behavioral reactions (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Lerner & Keltner,
2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Schwarz, 2012; Stephan et al., 2015).
After laying the foundation for the influence of threat and emotion in anti-Muslim
bias, the role of several individual differences in ideology will be explored, including
Social Dominance Orientation (i.e., endorsement of existing social hierarchies; SDO;
Pratto et al., 1994), Right-wing Authoritarianism (i.e., a belief that the norms and rules of
a society should be followed and enforced; RWA; Altemeyer, 1981), and Nationalism
(Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Although SDO plays an explanatory role in threat
perceptions associated with bias against Muslims (Uenal, 2016), incorporating RWA and
Nationalism may better illuminate the driving forces behind different types of threat
perceptions given their associations and conceptual overlap with symbolic and terroristic
threats, respectively (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Kyriakides et al., 2009). Thus,
understanding the roles of these factors is important for elucidating which mechanisms
best predict biases and discriminatory behaviors toward Muslims.
Finally, a deeper review of discriminatory policy support is provided with an
emphasis on policing policies that rely on religious and ethnic profiling. This discussion
provides more context to the issues facing Muslims in the United States, such as
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surveillance of mosques and Muslim communities by local law enforcement. Although
many have criticized the treatment of Muslim and Middle Eastern communities by law
enforcement following 9/11 (e.g., Henderson et al., 2006; Wasserman, 2015),
discriminatory policies against Muslims have received relatively high levels of support
from the public (Andersen et al., 2012; Collingwood et al., 2018; Saleem, et al., 2017).
These policies range from those that restrict the civil liberties of Muslims, such as voting
rights or increased surveillance by law enforcement (Andersen et al., 2012; Saleem et al.,
2017), to those that reduce immigration and increase military action in Muslim-majority
countries and regions (Collingwood et al., 2018; Saleem et al., 2017). Many of the
policies regarding increased surveillance and civil liberty restrictions operate on a
national level which can have broad implications for Muslims’ experiences as members
of American society. The current study aims to understand several factors which may
predict support for anti-Muslim policies in the United States.
Islamophobia in the United States: Definition, targets, and sources
Some of the earliest uses of the term “Islamophobia” have been traced to the late
1980s and early 1990s when the term was used to represent discrimination toward
Muslims (Allen, 2006, as cited in Bravo López, 2011). In 1997, the Runnymede Trust
developed and popularized the concept of Islamophobia as baseless hostility toward
Islam and subsequent fear and prejudice toward Muslims (Runnymede Trust, 1997, as
cited in Lee et al., 2009). Though Islamophobia has broadly been used to indicate
prejudice and discrimination toward Muslims and the religion of Islam, the specific
definition of this word has varied in its meaning and scope across time and disciplines
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(for a review, see Bleich, 2011). For example, while some researchers identify
Islamophobia as a form of xenophobia (e.g., Sheridan, 2006) or religious intolerance
(e.g., Geisser, 2003, as cited in Bravo López, 2011), others argue that Islamophobia is
driven by cultural and religious differences as well as racial identity (e.g., Bravo López,
2011; Garner & Selod, 2015; Schiffer & Wagner, 2011). Regardless of the specific
definition used, there is significant evidence suggesting that stereotypes of Muslims and
Middle Easterners as terrorists fuel anti-Muslim sentiment and Islamophobia (e.g.,
Andersen et al., 2012; Dubosh et al., 2015; Keeling & Hughes, 2011; Lee et al., 2009;
Lee et al., 2013; Saleem et al., 2017).
Islamophobia stems from bias against Muslims and the religion of Islam, with
Muslims frequently being perceived as inferior and threatening to Christian and western
values (Bravo López, 2011; Schiffer & Wagner, 2011; Sheridan, 2006). Islamophobia is
characterized by a belief that Muslims’ religious beliefs underlie their behaviors and that
the behaviors and attitudes of a few represent those of all Muslims (Schiffer & Wagner,
2011). One of the main issues with defining Islamophobia is that it is often unclear
whether this prejudice stems from one’s religious identity, skin color, or ethnic origin
(Bravo López, 2011). For example, Islamophobia shares many similarities and
differences with both racism and anti-Semitism. Schiffer and Wagner (2011) argue that
Islamophobia may be considered a form of “cultural racism,” in which the religious and
cultural identity, “Muslim,” is used as a grouping mechanism in place of a racial identity.
Specifically, the Muslim identity has been racialized such that perceptions of one
belonging to the group “Muslim” can stem from both physical and cultural characteristics
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(e.g., skin color, language, clothing; Garner & Selod, 2015). This broader definition of
race means that even when markers of Islam are not present, Muslim identity may be
presumed on the basis of other physical markers, such as skin tone. The resulting
conflation of multiple identities under the umbrella of one group as “Muslims” has led to
a homogenization of diverse groups of individuals, which has implications for individuals
that identify as Muslim as well as those erroneously perceived to be Muslim (Wang et al.,
2019). This homogenization is not only present in public discourse, but also in research
that uses terms like “Muslim” and “Arab” interchangeably (e.g., Echebarria-Echabe &
Guede, 2007) or uses ethnic identity as a proxy for religious identity (e.g., Adelman &
Verkuyten, 2019).
Islamophobia appears to be on the rise in the United States and other parts of the
Westernized world in recent decades. For example, British Muslims reported
experiencing more implicit (e.g., microaggressions) and explicit (e.g., exclusory policies)
discrimination following the 9/11 attacks compared to before (Sheridan, 2006). Implicit
and explicit attitudes are part of a dual-processing model which consists of both
unconscious (i.e., without awareness) and conscious (i.e., with awareness) processing
(Devine, 1989; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Implicit attitudes refer to those that occur
outside of conscious awareness or control (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald & Banaji,
1995) and are formed over time through repeated exposure to stimuli and associated
concepts (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Explicit attitudes refer to conscious attitudes that
involve controlled, conscious processing (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). These attitudes are
readily available and can be explicitly called to mind and expressed when asked about
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them. In the United States, people tend to hold more negative implicit attitudes toward
Muslims relative to Christians, White people, Black people, and people with non-Middle
Eastern or Islamic sounding foreign names (Gonsalkorale et al., 2009; Nosek et al., 2007;
Park et al., 2007; Rowatt et al., 2005). Although explicit attitudes are not always aligned
with implicit attitudes, particularly for intergroup attitudes (Devine, 1989; Nosek et al.,
2007), Muslims represent a group for which implicit and explicit attitudes are often
partially aligned (Park et al., 2007; Rowatt et al., 2005), with explicit negative attitudes
sometimes being more negative than implicit negative attitudes (Nosek et al., 2007). For
example, not only is negative affect highest against Muslims compared to several other
religious groups (i.e., Jews, Catholics, Protestants, Evangelical Christians, Buddhists,
Hindus, Mormons, and Atheists; Pew, 2017), but research suggests that people are more
willing to openly express bias against Muslims accused of religiously motivated crimes
compared to Christians (Miller et al., 2020). Together, these findings suggest people feel
more comfortable openly expressing negative attitudes toward Muslims, which is
consistent with the overall support for government-condoned monitoring and surveillance
of this group. Research suggests that implicit attitudes may exert more influence on
spontaneous and less controllable behaviors (e.g., body language, fast-paced decision
making), whereas explicit attitudes may exert more influence on deliberative and
controllable behaviors (e.g., verbal communication, slow-paced decision making;
Dovidio et al., 2002). Thus, while implicit attitudes toward Muslims may be more
predictive of performance on fast-paced decisions, such as shooting decisions (Essien et
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al., 2017; Unkelbach et al., 2008), explicit attitudes may be more important in predicting
support for long-term policy implementation (Andersen et al., 2012).
Perceptions and stereotypes of Muslims are influenced by media portrayals (e.g.,
Kearns et al., 2019a; Kearns et al., 2019b; Shen et al., 2018), which may be many
people’s only exposure to Muslims or Islam (Pratt, 2011). Terrorism is overrepresented in
the media compared to the number of deaths it is responsible for, with terrorism receiving
between 33.3% and 35.6% of media coverage despite terrorism making up less than
0.01% of deaths in the United States (Shen et al., 2018). Moreover, across all media
outlets investigated, terrorist attacks receive as much as 357% more coverage if the
attacker was Muslim compared to other perpetrators of terrorism (Kearns et al., 2019b).
For major news sources such as CNN and the New York Times, this bias increased to
758% more coverage. The disparity between the proportion of attacks perpetrated by
Muslims and the subsequent news coverage is further highlighted by the fact that even
though only 12.5% of terrorist attacks in the United States were perpetrated by Muslims
over the last decade, these attacks made up 50% of media coverage of terrorist attacks
(Kearns et al., 2019b). This overemphasis of Muslim-terrorist stereotypes is particularly
problematic in light of research suggesting that people are more willing to express bias
against Muslims who are accused of religiously motivated crimes (Miller et al., 2020).
Despite contention over the specific definition of Islamophobia and whom it
applies to, most empirical research has focused on the threat and fear of Muslims and
Islam (e.g., Bravo López, 2011; Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2013; Obaidi et al., 2018;
Schiffer & Wagner, 2011; Uenal, 2016). Based on previous work establishing the
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psychometric properties of Islamophobia, the current study defines Islamophobia as a
fear of Muslims and the Islamic faith (Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2013), while also
acknowledging that implications of this work may extend to those perceived to be
Muslims. This conceptualization of Islamophobia is comprised of two subcomponents,
including anti-Muslim attitudes and anti-Islam attitudes, to allow for a distinction
between negative attitudes and fear felt toward a group (i.e., Muslims) and a religious
doctrine (i.e., Islam). Although these are two distinct features of Islamophobia that can be
investigated separately (Uenal, 2016), their strong relation also allows for a global
measure of Islamophobia (Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2013).
To date, research has implicated a number of factors that influence levels of
Islamophobia and related anti-Muslim attitudes including threat perceptions (e.g.,
Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Velasco Gonzàlez et al., 2008; Uenal, 2016). The
specific type of threat perception influences affective experiences, which then predict
behavioral reactions, including whether to approach or avoid a potential threat (Cottrell &
Neuberg, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Schwarz, 2012;
Stephan et al., 2015). Several individual differences in ideology are also commonly
associated with intergroup bias (e.g., Social Dominance Orientation, Right-wing
authoritarianism, Nationalism; Altemeyer, 1981; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Pratto et
al., 1994) and different types of threat perceptions (e.g., realistic, symbolic; Crowson,
2009; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017), which may be useful in predicting which kinds of
people are most susceptible to perceiving Muslims as threatening in different ways and
how these perceptions may influence subsequent behavioral responses.
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Intergroup Threat Theory
Although group living has evolutionarily promoted survival and success for
humans, it also comes with associated costs and risks, as living within and among groups
of people inherently means surrounding oneself with others who could potentially cause
harm to oneself or the group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Stephan et al., 2015). Thus, to
minimize this risk, humans are attuned to the various threats that others could potentially
pose. Awareness of potential threats in our environment is thought to serve an
evolutionary function, as those who are more sensitive to perceived threats in the
environments would be able to decide on an appropriate course of action to either
overcome or avoid the threat (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Stephan et al., 2015). Notably,
threats need only be perceived in order to influence intergroup relations, regardless of
whether the group in question is actually attempting to shift the status quo in some way or
enact harm (Stephan et al., 2002; Stephan et al., 2009; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan
et al., 2015). Accordingly, while from an evolutionary perspective, greater attention to
threats is adaptive for survival, in terms of intergroup relations, the human predisposition
to perceive threats may underlie prejudice toward many groups (Stephan et al., 2002;
Stephan et al., 2009; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 2015). Based on research
emphasizing the role of threat in attitudes toward Muslims (e.g., Uenal, 2016; Wirtz et
al., 2015), the current study utilized an intergroup threat theory framework in
understanding what predicts and mediates levels of Islamophobia.
Conceptualizations of intergroup threat theory (e.g., Stephan et al., 2015) focus on
three different types of threat perceptions: realistic, symbolic, and more recently,
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terroristic (Uenal, 2016). Realistic threat perceptions refer to threats to the political or
economic power of one or one’s group (Rios et al., 2018; Stephan & Stephan, 2000;
Stephan et al., 2015; Uenal, 2016). Symbolic threat perceptions encompass threats to the
cultural values or beliefs that a group or individual holds (Rios et al., 2018; Stephan &
Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 2015; Uenal, 2016). Terroristic threat perceptions refer to
threats to the physical safety and well-being of an individual or their group (Doosje et al.,
2009; Uenal, 2016). In early conceptualizations of intergroup threat theory, realistic
threat perceptions encompassed political, economic, and safety threats (e.g., Stephan et
al., 2002; Stephan et al., 2009; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Realistic threat perceptions,
however, may be experienced and expressed in different ways based on context and
activated stereotypes about a group, which may lead to different affective and behavioral
outcomes (Stephan et al., 2015). Consequently, realistic and terroristic threat perceptions
have been delineated from one another to allow for a more comprehensive understanding
of the contributing factors of threat perceptions and subsequent outcomes (Uenal, 2016).
Similar to how stereotypes and evaluations of different groups differ in content,
the nature of perceived threats can vary depending on who is posing the threat and what
is being threatened in a specific context (Rios et al., 2018; Stephan et al., 2015). For
example, White people tend to perceive Black people as realistic threats to their political
power and social standing, whereas Christians tend to perceive Atheists as symbolic
threats to their values and worldview (Rios et al., 2018). Threat perceptions tend to be
positively correlated, however, suggesting that group-based differences in threat
perceptions may be explained by the context in which one is evaluating threat (Rios et al.,
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2018; Stephan et al., 2015). Specifically, stereotypes are thought to be a primary source
of threat perceptions, suggesting that an interaction between one’s identity and different
contexts may activate different stereotypes about that group, which may lead to different
types of threat perceptions depending on the nature of the activated stereotype (Rios et
al., 2018). The nature of these threat perceptions may, in turn, predict different attitudes
and behavioral outcomes (see Figure 1 for theoretical model).
Figure 1
Intergroup Threat Theory

Note. Diagram based on Intergroup Threat Theoretical Model proposed by Stephan et al.
(2015).
Just as the content of activated stereotypes may influence the type of threat
perceived, individual differences in ideology tend to be associated with threat perceptions
related to the content of those ideologies (Rios et al., 2018; Stephan et al., 2015). For
example, individuals who prefer societies that are hierarchically organized and who
desire to maintain the current social order may be more attuned to perceive threats by
certain groups, especially those perceived to pose realistic threats (Stephan et al., 2015).
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Additionally, those high in beliefs that a society’s way of being should be maintained
tend to be more susceptible to perceptions of symbolic threats, which challenge a given
worldview or certain values (Rios et al., 2018). For example, SDO better predicted
prejudice toward a fictitious immigrant group when described as threatening economic
resources, whereas RWA better predicted prejudice when this immigrant group was
described as threatening cultural values (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Further, for those high
in RWA, perceived intergroup threat mediated the relationship between a
multiculturalism prime, which threatened national cultural values, and prejudice toward
immigrants (Kauff et al., 2017). The social context in which one is evaluating threat can
also influence levels of each type of threat perception. For example, both immediately
following the attack of 9/11 and a year later, symbolic threat perceptions of Arab
immigrants were higher than symbolic threat perceptions of Mexican immigrants, likely
due to the attacks targeting national monuments (Hitlan et al., 2007). In contrast,
perceptions of Mexican immigrants as realistic threats increased following 9/11 due to
the negative impacts of the attacks on the existing economic recession. Similarly,
following the July 2005 Islamic terrorist attacks on London, terroristic and symbolic
threat perceptions of Muslims increased, whereas economic realistic threat perceptions
did not (Abrams et al., 2017).
Once activated, threat perceptions exert influence on intergroup attitudes and
outcomes either independently (e.g., realistic threat perceptions only) or in combination
with one another (e.g., realistic and symbolic threat perceptions; Stephan et al., 2015).
For example, although both realistic and symbolic threat perceptions contributed to
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negative attitudes toward Black people, perceived threats to power and resources were a
stronger predictor of anti-Black attitudes (Stephan et al., 2002). Further, threat
perceptions influenced levels of support for policies that would impact relevant groups,
such as immigration, affirmative action, and surveillance to expose terrorist plots
(Stephan et al., 2015). For instance, people in the United States were more likely to
support tougher punishment for immigration violations for immigrants who were
perceived as symbolic threats to American identity (i.e., Mexicans) compared to
immigrants who were perceived as less symbolically threatening (i.e., Canadians;
Mukherjee et al., 2013). Threat perceptions are important for understanding and
predicting behavioral outcomes, as well. Specifically, behavioral responses to intergroup
threat (e.g., attack, flight, negotiation) are impacted by affective and physiological
responses to the type of perceived threat, which has implications for many real-world
outcomes including policy initiatives and individual-level harassment and discrimination
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Stephan et al., 2015). Affective and physiological responses
will be further discussed in the next section on intergroup emotions.
Several studies have investigated the role of threat perceptions of Muslims in antiMuslim attitudes. In line with intergroup threat theory, which suggests that threat
perceptions are often correlated and shift in saliency depending on the context, Muslims
tend to be perceived by non-Muslims as symbolic, realistic, and terroristic threats (e.g.,
Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Obaidi et al., 2018; Raiya et al., 2008; Rios et al., 2018;
Uenal, 2016). Specifically, Muslims have been perceived as symbolic threats due to
stereotypes of Muslims as inherently sexist (Moss et al., 2019) and culturally
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incompatible with the Westernized world (Velasco Gonzàlez et al., 2008) and Christian
values (Raiya et al., 2008). Although Muslims were perceived as threatening to Christian
values based on ideological differences between each religion (Raiya et al., 2008),
Muslims can be perceived as symbolic threats by the general public, as well. For
example, in the context of the Netherlands, stereotypes about Muslims as threats to
national values and culture were often emphasized over stereotypes of Muslims as
threatening resources and power (Velasco González et al., 2008). Accordingly, Muslims
were perceived by participants as more symbolic threats than realistic threats in this
national context.
Muslims are also perceived as terroristic threats in accordance with stereotypes of
Muslims as extremists or terrorists (e.g., Ekman, 2015; Fischer et al., 2007; Uenal, 2016).
Support for this stems from investigations of the role of realistic threats in anti-Muslim
attitudes which focused on perceived safety, rather than power or economic threats (e.g.,
Ciftci, 2012; Velasco Gonzalez et al., 2008). For example, although Ciftci (2012) found
that stereotypes and attitudes toward Muslims were driven by perceptions of Muslims as
symbolic and realistic threats, their operationalization of realistic threats focused on
safety threats related to terrorism, which parallels current conceptualizations of terroristic
threat perceptions. In some contexts, however, Muslims also elicit perceptions of political
and economic realistic threat perceptions. For instance, voting intentions for the United
Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU) were predicted by perceptions that
Muslims threaten cultural values (i.e., symbolic threats) as well as economic well-being
and political power (i.e., realistic threats; Swami et al., 2018).
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Although past research illuminates the complexity of threat perceptions and
attitudes toward Muslims, few studies have investigated each of these threat perceptions
simultaneously, often focusing on one or two threats in isolation instead. Of the studies
investigating all three threat perceptions concurrently (i.e., symbolic, realistic, terroristic),
levels of each threat perception toward Muslims exist but are influenced by several
factors (Obaidi et al., 2018; Uenal, 2016). For example, one study found that realistic,
symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions each mediated the relationship between SDO
and Islamophobia (Uenal, 2016). Specific to policy support, Norwegians’ intentions to
support anti-Islamic movements were best predicted by symbolic threat perceptions
(Obaidi et al., 2018). These effects were also driven in part by realistic threat perceptions
but not terroristic threat perceptions, likely a result of the cultural context in which there
was no recent or imminent threat of Islamic extremist terrorism at the time of the survey
and emphasis on cultural incompatibility in Norway’s social discourse (Obaidi et al.,
2018). Still, more work is needed to better understand the complexities of perceptions of
Muslim threat and subsequent anti-Muslim attitudes and policy support, which the
current study aimed to address.
Overall, these findings indicate the existence of a complex relationship between
the socio-political context and threat perceptions toward Muslims, who may be perceived
as threatening in different ways depending on the nature of salient stereotypes. Different
types of threats may further have implications for policy support, as research suggests
that changes in support for discriminatory policies are influenced by the nature of
perceived threats (Rios et al., 2018). For example, while priming symbolic threat
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perceptions influenced support for policies that would impact homosexuals, a group
perceived as threatening traditional family values, it did not influence support for policies
regarding welfare recipients, a group perceived as threatening economic resources
(Brambilla & Butz, 2013). The differential impact of threat perceptions on policy support
may be driven by more than just content compatibility, however, as research suggests that
threat perceptions beget different emotional reactions that impact attitudes and behavior
in various ways (e.g., Wirtz et al., 2015).
The Role of Emotion in Intergroup Bias
Emotions refer to relatively short-lived affective responses and feelings that are
typically evoked by a known cause (Schwarz, 2012), such as perceived threats (Brown &
Hewstone, 2005; Stephan et al., 2015), and have the power to influence information
processing, judgment, and decision making (Clore et al., 2000). Affective responses are
considered a source of information about the environment that indicate the appraisal of a
target stimulus and impact subsequent evaluations and behaviors (Brown & Hewstone,
2005; Clore et al., 2000; Schwarz, 2012). Specifically, emotions can act as indicators of
whether to engage in certain behaviors with the goal of maintaining, decreasing, or
increasing the current emotional response or a desired emotional response (Barrett et al.,
2007). Affective appraisals are ongoing as individuals are nearly always receiving
affective cues from their social surroundings at both conscious (e.g., cognitive) and
unconscious (e.g., perceptual) levels of awareness (Clore et al., 2000). Importantly, the
affective responses that guide behaviors are part of an individual’s subjective construal of
situations, suggesting that the influence of intergroup emotions on behavioral outcomes
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may be driven by stereotypes and perceptions of a group rather than objective
information in a given environment (Tapias et al., 2007).
Emotional responses to a member of a particular group can occur at two different
levels. Specifically, emotions can be situationally constrained in which an episodic
instance or interaction elicits an emotion, or more chronically felt in which the salience of
the group category elicits an emotion (Kauff et al., 2017). Although both types of
intergroup emotional responses are important for understanding intergroup relations,
more chronically felt intergroup emotions better predict behavioral tendencies toward
different groups both directly and as a mediator between episodic intergroup emotions
and behavioral tendencies (Kauff et al., 2017). Therefore, chronic emotional responses to
different groups may be particularly relevant for global outcomes of threat appraisals,
such as discriminatory policy support, due to their broad, sweeping nature and their
impact on behaviors toward the entire group.
Emotions are thought to have evolved in order to alert individuals to potential
threats that require attention which suggests that threat perceptions and emotions are two
components of a single detection system (Clore et al., 2000; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005;
Schwarz, 2012). The sociofunctional approach to prejudice posits that different emotional
responses arise systematically from distinct threat perceptions (e.g., realistic, symbolic,
terroristic; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Schwarz, 2012; Stephan et al., 2015). For example,
higher perceptions of realistic threats predicted feelings of anger whereas higher
perceptions of safety threats predicted feelings of fear (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).
Further, Atheists, a group perceived as a symbolic threat by Christians, elicit feelings of
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moral disgust and distrust which are driven by stereotypes of Atheists as immoral (Cook
et al., 2015; Gervais et al., 2011; Gervais, 2014). Together, these findings suggest that
different types of threat perceptions, such as threats to one’s resources or threats to one’s
values, elicit different emotional responses that vary according to the content of the threat
at hand.
The nature of emotional reactions has important implications for behavioral
outcomes in response to specific threat perceptions (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner
& Keltner, 2001; Schwarz, 2012; Stephan et al., 2015). For instance, anger is associated
with riskier approach tendencies in response to threat (e.g., aggressive confrontation),
whereas fear is associated with less risky avoidance tendencies in response to threat (e.g.,
withdrawal from a situation; Cook et al., 2018; Kauff et al., 2017; Lerner & Keltner,
2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Mackie et al., 2000; Schwarz, 2012). These differences in
behavioral responses are likely driven by differences in one’s appraisal of their level of
control and certainty regarding the threat at hand. Specifically, anger indicates more
certainty and control whereas fear indicates less certainty and control (Lerner & Keltner,
2001). Thus, despite both emotional responses being high in negative valence and arousal
(Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), the nature of the underlying threat and
subsequent emotion can result in different behavioral responses that can have important
implications for Muslims’ intergroup experiences in the United States. To illustrate,
individuals who perceive Muslims as terroristic threats may take extra precautions to
avoid Muslims or vote to enact policies that would restrict immigration from Muslimmajority countries.

MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY

24

Investigations of the roles of emotions in attitudes toward Muslims also suggest
that emotions mediate the relationships between perceived threats and behavioral
outcomes. For example, perceptions of Muslims as symbolic threats predicted both social
distancing intentions as well as political intolerance (i.e., support for anti-Muslim
policies), but these effects were mediated by different emotions (Wirtz et al., 2015).
Specifically, the relationship between perceived symbolic threat and social distancing
intentions was mediated by disgust and pity, whereas anger mediated the relationship
between perceived symbolic threats and political intolerance toward Muslims. This is
consistent with the idea that disgust is associated with avoidance behaviors, while anger
is associated with behaviors aimed at correcting a perceived injustice or removing a
source of frustration (Mackie et al., 2000; Nabi, 2002; Wirtz et al., 2015). Intergroup
disgust sensitivity, or the tendency to respond to minority groups with disgust (Choma et
al., 2012; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Hodson et al., 2013), also differentially predicted
levels of Islamophobia (Choma et al., 2012). This effect was strengthened by
dispositional or chronic fear toward Muslims, suggesting that various threat perceptions
and emotions can interact, potentially compounding the impact of emotions on behavioral
responses. For example, as both fear and disgust predict avoidant behaviors, it is possible
that the combination of these two emotions would exacerbate the tendency to avoid
certain groups of people, such as Muslims. These findings also suggest that individual
differences in the tendency to perceive certain groups of people as threatening in specific
ways are important in understanding attitudes and behavioral reactions toward those
groups.
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Individual Differences in Ideology as Predictors of Prejudice
Social psychology has identified many individual differences in personality and
ideology that can predict intergroup attitudes, including Social Dominance Orientation
(SDO; Pratto, et al., 1994), Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981), and
Nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). In addition to the predictive validity of each
of these constructs for intergroup outcomes and support for policies that impact
intergroup relations, the relevance of these specific individual differences in ideology for
the current study lie in their associations with different types of threat perceptions. Thus,
the roles of individual differences in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism in intergroup relations
and threat perceptions were delineated both separately and in combination with one
another.
Social Dominance Orientation
Social dominance theory posits that social systems are inherently organized into
group-based hierarchies with at least one dominant social group, often a racial, religious,
or national group (Sidanius et al., 1994). Dominance within social systems is maintained
through both individual and structural factors which perpetuate a caste-like system in
which the dominant group holds a disproportionate amount of social power and value
(Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 2004). SDO represents an
individualized preference for hierarchically arranged social structures in which some
groups are dominant while others are subordinate (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al.,
1994). SDO may be further broken down into two subcomponents, one which indicates a
preference for forcefully oppressing lower status groups (i.e., Dominance; SDO-D) and
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the second involving the utilization of subtler hierarchy-enhancing policies (i.e.,
Egalitarianism; SDO-E) in order to maintain group-based dominance (Ho et al., 2015). In
some contexts, each component of SDO may predict different attitudes. For example,
SDO-D better predicted support for Trump in the 2016 presidential election than SDO-E
(Womick et al., 2018). Although the subcomponents of SDO are sometimes examined
separately in this way, most work investigates these components together in a single
composite scale (e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Pratto et al., 1998).
In general, White individuals and men both tend to be higher in SDO (Pratto et
al., 1994; Pratto et al., 1998; Sidanius et al., 1994). Those who are higher in SDO tend to
support hierarchy-enhancing policies and take hierarchy-enhancing roles, which
contribute to maintaining hierarchical social structures (Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius et al.,
1994). Conversely, individuals lower in SDO tend to lean toward hierarchy-attenuating
policies and roles, which contribute to creating equality in the social structure. For
example, police officers (a hierarchy-enhancing role) tended to be higher in SDO than
public defenders (a hierarchy-attenuating role), even when controlling for differences in
demographics such as gender, education, and social class (Sidanius et al., 1994). Socially
dominant attitudes and support for hierarchy-enhancing policies largely stem from
legitimizing myths, which justify the need for policies that reinforce existing social
structures (Pratto et al., 2006). For example, SDO predicted support for increased military
spending, support for war, and opposition for increased funding for social welfare (Pratto
et al., 1998). Further, each of these relationships was mediated by several legitimizing

MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY

27

myths such as conservatism, which legitimizes wealth inequality through the promotion
of capitalism.
SDO may indicate behavioral predispositions, as it is a relatively stable predictor
of intergroup attitudes and support for policies that directly impact subordinate groups
(e.g., Pratto et al., 2006; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 2004).
For example, it could be that perceptions of Muslims as immigrants who threaten the jobs
and economic prosperity of Americans serve to legitimize the perceived need for policies
that reduce immigration from Muslim-majority countries. Accordingly, higher levels of
SDO were related to perceived threats of Muslims by non-Muslims (Dunwoody &
McFarland, 2018). Relationships between SDO and intergroup attitudes were driven in
part by perceived competition with other groups, which may be conceptually related to
realistic threat perceptions (Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Perry et al., 2013). Consequently,
the current study aimed to examine the predictive validity of SDO in realistic threat
perceptions, as well as subsequent anti-Muslim attitudes and support for anti-Muslim
policies.
Right-wing Authoritarianism
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is a multidimensional individual difference
construct that refers to one’s preference for social order and obedience to authorities
(Altemeyer, 1981; Mallinas et al., 2019; Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 2007; Smith &
Winter, 2002). RWA consists of several components including RWA submission, RWA
aggression, and RWA conservatism (Altemeyer, 1981; Johnson et al., 2012; Manganelli
Rattazzi et al., 2007). RWA submission encompasses the belief that authority figures in
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society should be obeyed. RWA aggression refers to beliefs that those who violate rules
imposed by society’s authority figures should be punished. RWA conservatism includes
beliefs that a society’s traditional values should be upheld. RWA is often considered as a
moralization of a given society, meaning that cultural norms and values are seen as
correct and true, and at times, requiring reinforcement. In particular, the conservatism
component of RWA has been shown to align with other constructs relating to violations
of one’s fundamental beliefs about the world (e.g., morality, religious fundamentalism;
Johnson et al., 2012; Mallinas et al., 2019), suggesting that this construct may be useful
in predicting attitudes toward groups perceived as violating cultural and societal norms
and values. Accordingly, research suggests that RWA is associated with implicit and
explicit prejudice toward a number of groups including Muslims and Arabs (Johnson et
al., 2012; Rowatt et al., 2005), as well as attitudes surrounding social policies (Wilson &
Sibley, 2013) and police use of force (Gerber & Jackson, 2017). Specifically, research
suggests that those high in RWA tend to be more supportive of conservative policies
(e.g., restricting abortion, disenfranchising labor unions) and more supportive of war
(Wilson & Sibley, 2013).
Although conceptually related in many ways, SDO and RWA are distinct
constructs that can predict different outcomes (e.g., Gerber & Jackson, 2017; Golec de
Zavala et al., 2017; Pettigrew, 2017). For example, SDO and RWA accounted for a
substantial amount of the variance in prejudice toward Black people, women, and
homosexuals, despite moderate correlations between the constructs (Altemeyer, 1998 as
cited in Reynolds et al., 2001). Additionally, SDO and RWA may differentially predict
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support for police use of force based on the level of force used. Specifically, while SDO
predicted support for reasonable use of force by police, RWA predicted support for
excessive use of force by police, presumably due to increased levels of trust in the
ingroup’s authority figures (Gerber & Jackson, 2017). In certain contexts, however, SDO
and RWA appear to have both interactive and additive effects on one another (e.g.,
Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2006; Osborne et al., 2017; Wilson & Sibley, 2013). For example,
very low levels of SDO and RWA predicted liberalism, reflecting their interactive effects
on one another (Wilson & Sibley, 2013). Very high levels of SDO and RWA, however,
predicted conservatism, reflecting the additive effects of each individual difference
(Wilson & Sibley, 2013). The nature of the effects of these constructs on one another
may be in part due to identity salience and relevance in a specific context.
In terms of threat perceptions, complementary patterns to the relation between
SDO and realistic threat perceptions emerge between RWA and symbolic threat
perceptions. For example, the relationship between RWA and support for stricter
immigration laws was mediated by perceptions of cultural threat, whereas the relationship
between SDO and support for stricter immigration laws was mediated by perceived
competition (Craig & Richeson, 2014b). Consistent with this pattern, RWA also
predicted support for ethnic persecution when participants were primed with immigrant
targets who failed to assimilate to national ingroup norms, presumably representing
threats to social values (Thomsen et al., 2008). Conversely, SDO predicted support for
ethnic persecution when participants were primed with immigrant targets who
successfully assimilated to national ingroup norms, presumably representing a threat to
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one’s standing in the social hierarchy as more people successfully enter a given society.
Together, these findings suggest that different individual differences in ideology may be
more or less relevant in perceiving different types of threats. RWA may be particularly
important for understanding support for discriminatory policing policies regarding
Muslim surveillance. For instance, those who are high in RWA may be more likely to
perceive certain groups as threatening their cultural values and social order, as well as
being more willing to allocate resources to enforcing societal norms through policing
practices such as surveillance. Thus, the current study also aimed to elucidate the role of
RWA in symbolic threat perceptions as well as subsequent anti-Muslim attitudes and
policy support.
Nationalism
Nationalism is a feeling of belonging to a particular nation accompanied by
beliefs that one’s nation is superior to others and a desire to maintain national purity
(Dekker et al., 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Zmigrod et al., 2018). This specific
national attitude differs from related constructs such as patriotism, which represents
feelings of attachment to one’s nation, or national identity, which represents
identification as a member of one’s nation (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Unlike
patriotism and national identification, Nationalism is characterized by the promotion of
rigid national exclusionism to the detriment of other nations or those perceived to belong
to other nations (Dekker et al., 2003; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Kosterman & Feshbach,
1989; Osborne et al., 2019; Zmigrod et al., 2018). This type of nationalistic exclusionism
tends to lead to negative intergroup attitudes and interactions which differ from the
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effects of patriotism (Ayub & Jehn, 2010). For example, Nationalism, but not patriotism,
predicted support for military nuclear armament (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), as well
as a preference for national cultural goods over international goods (Meuleman et al.,
2013). Nationalism may be particularly relevant in understanding attitudes toward
Muslims in the United States, as those who are Muslim tend to be perceived as “insider
enemies” who must prove their loyalty to their western identity above and beyond that of
their religious or ethnic identities (Poynting & Mason, 2007). Those high in Nationalism
may be more susceptible to perceiving threats to their national identity, and thus, more
supportive of xenophobic and anti-Muslim political platforms (Kende & Krekó, 2020). In
line with these findings, flag-display behaviors, which are typically thought to represent
patriotic attitudes and often occur following major national events such as the 9/11
terrorist attacks (Skitka, 2005), actually led to increased Nationalistic rather than patriotic
attitudes (Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008). Together, these findings suggest that
Nationalism may play a role in negative attitudes toward Muslims who are often
perceived as not belonging to western national groups (e.g., Bravo López, 2011; Dubosh
et al., 2015).
Nationalism is also conceptually related to RWA and SDO. Not only has RWA
aggression positively related with Nationalism (Todosijevic, 1998), but SDO and RWA
each moderately predicted Nationalism and support for military aggression (Crowson,
2009). Additionally, a longitudinal study in New Zealand found that SDO and RWA
predicted Nationalism over time, with no longitudinal effect of Nationalism on SDO and
RWA (Osborne et al., 2017). Still, the independent role of Nationalism as a distinct
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predictor of intergroup attitudes is evident. Specifically, SDO, RWA, and Nationalism
each independently predicted support in the decision for the UK to leave the EU, and
these relationships were mediated by the perceived threats of immigrants in the UK
(Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). Despite items measuring each type of threat perception
(i.e., realistic, symbolic, and terroristic), these studies aggregated their threat perception
items into a single scale, potentially obscuring the nuances in the relationships between
individual differences and discrete threat perceptions. Further, much of the current work
on the consequences of Nationalistic attitudes for Muslims exists in contexts outside of
the United States, leaving the question open of how these attitudes impact outcomes for
Muslims in the specific political context of the United States.
Although each of these individual differences in ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA,
Nationalism) and threat perceptions (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic) have not
previously been investigated concurrently (as is the goal of the current study), there is
robust evidence that SDO, RWA, and Nationalism are related to threat perceptions in
fundamentally different ways. Specifically, the effect of several of these constructs on
intergroup attitudes and outcomes is mediated through perceptions of threat by relevant
groups (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Crowson, 2009; Perry et al., 2013). For example,
not only was RWA more strongly associated with perceptions of terrorists as symbolic
threats than realistic threats, but RWA was also a better predictor of symbolic threat
perceptions than SDO (Crowson, 2009). This is unsurprising considering that the nature
of symbolic threats (i.e., threats to one’s values or worldview) are highly relevant for
individuals high in RWA who wish to maintain the traditional norms and values of their
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society and culture. Further, although less empirical evidence currently exists
investigating the relationship between Nationalism and SDO with perceived threats, these
individual difference constructs map onto terroristic and realistic threat perceptions,
respectively. For example, research suggests that Nationalism is strongly associated with
perceptions of the national ingroup as ethnically and culturally homogenous (e.g.,
Kyriakides et al., 2009; Molina et al., 2014; Yogeeswaran et al., 2019) and that Muslims
are often perceived as immigrants and terrorists (e.g., Andersen et al., 2012; Dubosh et
al., 2015; Keeling & Hughes, 2011; Noor et al., 2019). Together, this may hold
implications for the role of Nationalism in predicting threat perceptions toward Muslims
who may be perceived as a greater threat to public safety by someone who is predisposed
to be concerned with national superiority and purity (i.e., someone high in Nationalism).
Additionally, consistent with research that suggests that those high in SDO may be
particularly sensitive to perceived competition with other groups (Craig & Richeson,
2014b; Thomsen et al., 2008), it is likely that these individuals are also more susceptible
to other forms of perceived threats to the social hierarchy, such as their ingroup’s social
standing and power within that hierarchy. Such concerns are often associated with issues
of power and status in society which are conceptually related to realistic threat
perceptions that center around economic well-being and political power (a form of social
power; Uenal, 2016). These findings suggest that different individual differences in
ideology may increase susceptibility to ideological-specific threats. For example, those
who are high in SDO, and thus value the existing social power structure in society, may
be particularly attuned to threat to that power structure (i.e., realistic threat). Taken
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together, the current study aimed to understand how individual differences in ideology
may differentially predict attitudes toward Muslims and subsequent policy support
through specific types of threat perceptions.
Anti-Muslim Bias in Policing and Policy
As mentioned previously, several anti-Muslim policies have been proposed and
implemented in the years since 9/11, including increased surveillance (Apuzzo &
Goldman, 2011a; 2011b; Apuzzo et al., 2011), decreased immigration from Muslimmajority countries (Collingwood et al., 2018; Elsheikh et al., 2017), and the prohibition
of Sharia law in the United States (Elsheikh et al., 2017). Many of these policies are
rooted in stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists and a rising tide of Islamophobia (e.g., Lee
et al., 2009; Lee, et al., 2013), which has resulted in non-empirically supported policing
practices that characterize Muslims and their communities as a suspect class of citizens
that necessitate extra inspection (Ali, 2016; Elsheikh et al., 2017). As each previous
section has described, threat perceptions, emotions, and individual differences influence
intergroup attitudes and related policies. The goal of the current section is to outline
previous research implicating each of these factors in support for policies that
disproportionately impact minority groups. After laying this foundation, research on
support for anti-Muslim policies will be delineated in order to provide context and
direction for the specific policy items considered in the current study.
Threat perceptions can influence policy support in different ways depending on
the type of threat perceived and social context. For example, exposure to multiculturalism
(Morrison et al., 2010) and increasing national diversity (Craig & Richeson, 2014a) can
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increase both realistic and symbolic threat perceptions, which subsequently predict
support for more conservative foreign, economic, and social policies that would reduce
the perceived threat of increasing diversity and multiculturalism (Osborn et al., 2019).
Moreover, exposure to increasing diversity in the United States predicted support for
Trump in the 2016 presidential election through increased realistic threat perceptions
(Osborn et al., 2019). These findings suggest that threat perceptions may influence
individuals’ support for policies and politicians whose goals align with reducing the
perceived threat. Accordingly, participants who were presented with a news release
indicating that the Hispanic population in the United States will outnumber the White
population by the year 2042 showed increased support for Trump in the 2016 presidential
election and anti-immigrant policies as well as more opposition to political correctness
norms, all of which were mediated by perceived realistic threats to their group status
(Major et al., 2018).
Emotions are relevant in understanding reactions to threat perceptions and
subsequent policy support. Recall that, according to the sociofunctional approach,
emotions can be a result of perceived threats (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), which can
predict different types of evaluations and behaviors (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner &
Keltner, 2001). For instance, while fear is associated with avoidance tendencies, anger is
associated with approach tendencies. These evaluations and behaviors can extend to
outcomes such as policy support and voting intentions, as well. For example, in a sample
of Americans, inducing fear about future threats by those responsible for the attacks of
9/11 led to increased support for policies aimed at preventing terrorism (Lerner et al.,
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2003). Conversely, inducing anger by presenting participants with images of celebrations
of the 9/11 attacks by people in Arab countries led to increased support for more punitive
policies such as deportation. Further, in support of the sociofunctional approach,
emotions appear to mediate the relationship between perceived threat and policy support.
For example, in the Netherlands, those who reported higher levels of perceived symbolic
threat by Muslims also reported higher feelings of anger and disgust when thinking about
Muslims (Wirtz et al., 2015). Only anger, however, predicted support for the restriction
of Muslim immigration and religious rights, such as wearing religious clothing in public
and building local mosques. Disgust, on the other hand, predicted preferences for
maintaining social distance from Muslims. These findings support the importance of
understanding the role of both perceived threats and emotional evaluations in predicting
attitudes toward Muslims and subsequent anti-Muslim policy support.
Individual differences in ideology also play a role in support for different policy
measures both in isolation and in combination with threat perceptions and emotions. For
instance, while SDO and RWA both predict similar outcomes, such as support for
increased military spending and military action against terrorists (Crowson, 2009; Pratto
et al., 1998), they may operate through different perceived threats. Consistent with
intergroup threat theory, the relationships between SDO and RWA with support for
stricter immigration laws were mediated by perceived realistic and symbolic threats,
respectively (Craig & Richeson, 2014b). Further, SDO predicted support for stricter
immigration through perceived realistic threat regardless of whether the national context
was in their home country (i.e., United States) or some other country (i.e., Singapore).
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RWA, however, only predicted support for stricter immigration through perceived
realistic threat in the context of their home country, presumably because it was difficult
for participants to empathize perceived symbolic threat with an outside nation that could
itself present a symbolic threat to their ingroup (Craig & Richeson, 2014b). Nationalism
is also positively related to support for policies in important ways. Higher levels of
Nationalism, for instance, predicted increased support for policies to punish
undocumented immigrants, but not to punish the citizens who illegally hire them
(Mukherjee et al., 2012). Further, this effect was strongest for those who held a cultural
construction of American identity characterized by citizenship and the ability to speak
English, suggesting that support for this policy may have been driven by perceived
threats by immigrants. Thus, for those high in Nationalism, support for some policies
may be based more on ethnocentrism and perceived threat by immigrants than their
purported concern for law and order. Together, this research suggests the importance of
considering multiple factors in understanding what predicts prejudice toward Muslims
and subsequent policy support that can have very real impacts on the lives of Muslims
residing in the United States.
As previously described, Muslims in the United States have been subject to
increased surveillance and investigation since the attacks of 9/11 by both federal and
local law enforcement (e.g., Henderson et al., 2006; Meeropol, 2015; OIG, 2003;
Wasserman, 2015). Several cases have been brought against the City of New York, the
FBI, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS;
e.g., CRC, 2018; 2020). Most relevant to the current study are Hassan v. City of New
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York (CRC, 2018) and Tanvir v. Tanzin (CRC, 2020). Hassan v. City of New York is a
lawsuit against the City of New York for their surveillance of Muslim Americans,
especially in New York and New Jersey. The NYPD’s program for Muslim surveillance
was brought to light in 2011 by a series of reports by the Associated Press, which
highlighted the strategies used by police officers, their record keeping, and the largely
unsuccessful outcomes of the program in detecting terrorism (Apuzzo & Goldman,
2011a; 2011b; Apuzzo et al., 2011). Police officers worked from a list of “ancestries of
interest,” most of which were descendent from Muslim countries (e.g., Pakistani, Somali,
Middle Eastern). Although the NYPD, and then-Mayor Bloomberg, refuted that they
relied on religious profiling in this program, this claim is brought into doubt by the fact
that “American Black Muslim” was also included as an ancestry of interest (Apuzzo &
Goldman, 2011b).
Police officers and other law enforcement agencies did not infiltrate Muslim
communities alone, as they often worked to identify potential informants who could spy
on their own communities and report back to law enforcement (Apuzzo & Goldman,
2011b). As part of a “debriefing program,” whenever a person was arrested who might be
useful for collecting intelligence, police officers were instructed to subject them to extra
questioning in an attempt to know more about their communities and hopefully, to put
them to work as informants. Those who refused to comply with instructions to spy on
their communities were often retaliated against. For example, Tanvir v. Tanzin is a
lawsuit against the FBI, the DOJ, and the DHS for the placement of several American
Muslim men with no criminal records on the No-Fly List, a subset of a larger U.S.
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government terrorist screening database. In this case, the four plaintiffs were reportedly
approached by the FBI who sought to recruit them as informants within their Muslim
communities. Following their denial, the men were placed on the No-Fly List which
resulted in most not being able to see their families overseas for several years (CRC,
2020). One man was not able to visit his 93-year-old grandmother despite her severe
illness and another was not able to see his wife and young children for nearly five years.
The FBI disputes that the men were placed on the No-Fly list as an act of retaliation. The
fact that each man was reportedly told by the FBI that they could fly again if they agreed
to work as informants, however, suggests that the men were not truly considered to be
dangerous, further bringing into question the FBI’s reason for placing them on the No-Fly
list.
Government sanctioned discrimination against Muslims in the United States has
continued in other ways as well in the years since 9/11. On January 27th, 2017, thenPresident Trump signed Executive Order 13769, more commonly known as the Muslim
Ban (Trump, 2017a). The original Muslim Ban restricted travel from seven
predominantly Muslim countries to the United States for 90 days, including Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, and suspended the entry of Syrian refugees to
the United States indefinitely (Trump, 2017a). The Muslim Ban received much criticism
from the public and the Office of the Inspector General and was determined to violate
multiple existing court orders by preventing affected travelers from boarding airplanes
bound for the United States (OIG, 2018). Some evidence also exists that the
implementation of the Muslim Ban may have violated the Due Process and Equal

MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY

40

Protection Clauses of the Constitution which, respectively, protect citizens from
prosecution without due process of law, and set forth that the law will be applied equally
to all individuals [Legal Information Institute (LII), n.d.a; n.d.b; OIG, 2018]. In the face
of these challenges, however, the Trump administration continued to adapt the Muslim
Ban in minor ways in order to successfully implement restrictions on travel from several
Muslim-majority countries (ACLU, 2020). The final version of the Muslim Ban,
Executive Order 13780, was implemented in October of 2017 and placed restrictions on
travel from eleven countries, eight of which were Muslim-majority countries (i.e., Egypt,
Iran, Libya, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen; Trump, 2017b). Although this ban
has since been revoked by President Biden (2021), the effects of the ban are expected to
be enduring as the already slow process for vetting and approving immigration from
these countries have become increasingly backlogged during the time the ban was in
effect (Stone, 2021). Further, an ABC News/Ipsos poll showed that only a slight majority
of American respondents (55%) supported President Biden’s revocation of the Muslim
ban (“American Public Supports”, 2021). Thus, not only have those wishing to enter the
United States have been increasingly denied, but Muslim communities within the United
States face increased bias and scrutiny by law enforcement.
Similar to findings regarding the low success rates of other racial profiling
programs such as stop and frisk (e.g., Gelman et al., 2007), there is a growing body of
research suggesting that increased policing of Muslims may be ineffective, resulting in
few terrorism-related charges (Blackwood et al., 2016; Ramirez, 2012). Further, some
argue that attempting to intercept terrorism through immigration policy is likely to be
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fruitless given that many of those who commit terrorist attacks are often in the country
legally. For example, both the 9/11 hijackers and the Boston Marathon bombers were in
the United States legally at the time of their attacks (Ramirez, 2012). Although terrorist
attacks are undoubtedly memorable and horrific, there is little evidence that pre-9/11
methods of deterring terrorism were unsuccessful, considering that less than 0.01% of all
deaths in the United States were the result of terrorism in the years preceding 2001
(Ritchie et al., 2019). Further, counterterrorism efforts have even backfired in some cases
and led Muslims to identify less with their American identity (Blackwood et al., 2016).
This could allow for the increased radicalization of those who feel they have lost their
national identity, indicating a need for more empirically formed and less identity-based
counterterrorism efforts. More specific to the surveillance programs outlined above, AP
reporting reveals that the surveillance of Muslims and their communities in New York
City and surrounding areas did not result in a single terrorism-related charge (Apuzzo et
al., 2011).
At this point, it is clear that Muslims and Middle Easterners in the United States
have been under excessive scrutiny for terrorism-related investigations on the basis of
their perceived or actual racial and religious identities (CRC, 2018; 2020; Blackwood et
al., 2016; Henderson et al., 2006). Empirical work demonstrating the prevalence and
impact of Muslim surveillance by law enforcement, however, is limited, as evidenced by
the media sources responsible for most of the coverage surrounding these issues and
limited police reporting. Given that many Americans’ only exposure to Muslims is
through the media they consume (Pratt, 2011), much of the existing empirical research on
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support for anti-Muslim policies focuses on the role of media portrayals of Muslims,
often with an emphasis on military actions and immigration. Mainstream media often
perpetuates stereotypes of Muslims as outsider terrorists (Kearns et al., 2019b; Shen et
al., 2018) which can influence attitudes and support for anti-Muslim policy (Andersen et
al., 2012; Saleem et al., 2017). Specifically, portraying Muslims as terrorists in news
broadcasts predicted increased support for a number of policies aimed at increasing
surveillance of Muslims in the United States, as well as increasing military action in
Muslim-majority countries (Saleem et al., 2017). Similarly, the source and manner in
which news is communicated can also influence support for discriminatory policies
against Muslims (Andersen et al., 2012). In particular, news broadcasting showed a
stronger effect in subsequent policy support than entertainment media (e.g., clips from a
movie about a Muslim terrorist group). Further, negative, stereotypical coverage led to
increased support for anti-Muslim policies, while positive, counter-stereotypical coverage
trended toward decreased support for these policies (Andersen et al., 2012). Recall,
however, that terrorist attacks received 357% more coverage when perpetrated by a
Muslim compared to other groups. Thus, not only does the overrepresentation of Islamic
terrorist attacks in mainstream media perpetuate and reinforce stereotypes about
Muslims, but it may also influence support for discriminatory policies against Muslims
(Andersen et al., 2012; Saleem et al., 2017).
Less research exists on the specific roles of threat perceptions, emotions, and
individual differences in anti-Muslim policy support. Still, related research provides some
insights on how these factors influence support for anti-Muslim policies. For example,
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beliefs that being a “true” New Zealander encompasses specific ancestral heritage and
cultural characteristics such as speaking English predicted more negative attitudes toward
Muslims and opposition toward increasing diversity through immigration (Yogeeswaran
et al., 2019). Although threat perceptions were not directly measured in this study, the
pattern of findings is consistent with research suggesting that symbolic threat perceptions
may emerge particularly for those who hold largely ethnic and cultural conceptions of
their national identity (e.g., Morrison et al., 2010). Additionally, intentions to vote for the
UK to leave the EU were influenced directly by realistic threat perceptions related to
Muslim immigrants, as well as indirectly via symbolic threat perceptions (Swami et al.,
2018). This suggests that both concerns about the availability of resources and concerns
about the national purity of the UK with Islamic influence were able to impact
participants’ decisions regarding large-scale, national policy change.
Consistent with research suggesting that individual differences in ideology predict
threat perceptions in general (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014b), the same appears to be true
for perceived threat by Muslims. Both SDO and RWA predicted threat perceptions of
Muslims and subsequent support for anti-Muslim policies, specifically (Dunwoody &
McFarland, 2018). To expand, those with higher levels of SDO and RWA supported a
law requiring Muslims to register with government organizations, as well as support for
the use of physical force in order to make Muslims reveal the identity of unregistered
Muslims. Moreover, each of these relationships was partially mediated by perceived
threats. Although this study measured perceptions of threat related to realistic, symbolic,
and terroristic threats, there were no apparent effects of threat type on policy support, and
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thus, threat perceptions were collapsed into a single score in analyses. One possible
reason for the lack of effect by threat type, however, may have been a lack of
consideration of the emotional components of threat perceptions. For example, as
outlined earlier in this section, emotions appear to play a mediating role in the
relationship between threat perceptions and anti-Muslim policy support, with anger
predicting more political intolerance of Muslims, such as not allowing the building of
mosques, and disgust predicting preference for increased social distance from Muslims,
such as not wanting Muslims living in one’s neighborhood (Wirtz et al., 2015). Together,
these findings suggest that many factors may work together to influence attitudes toward
Muslims, which holds implications for their treatment by both the public and by law
enforcement in the United States.
The existing body of research investigating support for anti-Muslim policies
leaves room for a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms that may be most
pertinent for reducing stereotypes about Muslims and related fears. One of the challenges
of creating positive change in policy and policing practices lies in the popularity of
current policies which are often discriminatory (Andersen et al., 2012; Collingwood et
al., 2018; Saleem et al., 2017; Swami et al., 2018). Specifically, the fact that much of this
surveillance is publicly sponsored by state and federal law enforcement agencies
(Henderson et al., 2006; Keeling & Hughes, 2011; Meeropol, 2015) makes enacting
change in Muslim policing practices more difficult. Therefore, it is important to
understand what factors may influence support for discriminatory policies that directly
impact Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim in the United States. Perceptions of
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Muslims appear to largely be a result of cultural ignorance and misrepresentation,
characterized by threat and fear (Pratt, 2011) and several contributing factors of antiMuslim policy support have emerged from the existing body of research, including threat
perceptions (Swami et al., 2018), emotional reactions (Wirtz et al., 2015), and individual
differences in ideology (Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018). Thus, the current study aimed
to assess the process through which individual differences, threat perceptions, and
emotions influence anti-Muslim attitudes and subsequent anti-Muslim policy support.
The Current Study
The goals of the current study were threefold. First, consistent with research
which suggests that threat perceptions underlie prejudice toward Muslims (e.g.,
Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Uenal, 2016) and that certain individual differences in
ideology may influence perceptions of threat and intergroup bias (Altemeyer, 1981;
Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Pratto et al., 1994), this study focused on the roles of
several individual differences in ideology and threat perceptions in levels of
Islamophobia and subsequent support for anti-Muslim policies. Specifically, this research
investigated the roles of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism in predicting Islamophobia, as
well as the mediating roles of realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions in
these relationships. This aim was also based on my own pilot research that examined the
relationships between SDO, RWA, and Nationalism on Islamophobia through realistic,
symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions. This preliminary study (N = 191) employed
structural equation modeling (SEM) and showed that SDO, RWA, and Nationalism
positively predicted realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions, respectively,
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and that each type of threat positively predicted Islamophobia. Moreover, the indirect
effects of SDO and RWA on Islamophobia through realistic and symbolic threat
perceptions were significant and in the expected directions. The indirect effect of
Nationalism on Islamophobia through terroristic threat perceptions, however, was
nonsignificant in this sample. This study was underpowered due to the small sample size
acquired and the large sample sizes needed to obtain adequate power in SEM. Thus, the
current study builds on this work by recruiting a larger sample to reach a minimum power
level of .80, accounting for the interrelations that likely exist between each individual
difference in ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, Nationalism) and each type of threat perception
(i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic), and by expanding the model to include the impacts
of these factors (i.e., individual differences, threat perceptions, Islamophobia) on antiMuslim policy support.
Similar to previous research (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), the second aim of
this study was to determine the emotional components predicted by each specific threat
perception. Previous work suggests that several emotions are associated with distinct
types of threat perceptions (e.g., anger with realistic threats, distrust with symbolic
threats; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). To date and to my knowledge, no empirical research
has assessed the emotional components of each type of threat since the addition of
terroristic threat perceptions into the intergroup threat framework. Thus, this study aimed
to assess which emotions are associated with and predicted by different types of threat
perceptions.
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The third and final aim of the current study was to examine the mediational effect
of emotional reactions in the relationships between different types of threat perceptions
and support for discriminatory policies toward Muslims. This aim was based on work
suggesting that emotional reactions may be useful for predicting different types of
behaviors (e.g., anger predicting aggression and fear predicting social distancing; Lerner
& Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Extant research has not fully investigated the
roles of individual differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and emotional reactions in
support for anti-Muslim policies, especially those regarding surveillance by law
enforcement. Altogether, this study aimed to substantially contribute to our understanding
of individual differences in perceptions of Muslims as threats and their subsequent
emotional reactions as they relate to Muslim metering and surveillance policy support.
Hypotheses
The current study consists of three main aims which include two main hypotheses
as well as one data-driven exploratory hypothesis with a theoretically based contingency
hypothesis. Each of these aims and hypotheses focuses on the roles of individual
differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and emotional reactions in bias toward and
discrimination against Muslims.
Aim 1
Aim 1 consists of 4 sub-hypotheses (1a-1d). Overall, it was expected that
individual differences in ideology would predict threat perceptions which would predict
Islamophobia and subsequent support for anti-Muslim policies, representing an ideologythreat-attitude-behavior model of anti-Muslim bias (see Figure 2). SEM was used to
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simultaneously test hypotheses 1a-d in a single model. SEM refers to a broad family of
theory-driven, causal inference techniques based on a given theoretical model and
parameter specifications (Kline, 2015). Since SEM can take the covariances between
variables into account when testing the fit of the model and hypotheses (Kline, 2015),
these techniques can be particularly useful in cases where independent variables are
expected to correlate, as is the case in the current analysis (e.g., SDO and RWA are
expected to be related). This model was tested to establish the role of each individual
difference in threat perceptions, anti-Muslim attitudes (i.e., Islamophobia), and
subsequent anti-Muslim policy support by comparing the strengths of each mediational
path.
Figure 2
Aim 1 Full Model

Note. Full hypothesized structural equation model for aim 1 with all paths included.
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Hypothesis 1a. Based on previous research suggesting that SDO predicts
intergroup bias (e.g., Pratto et al., 2006; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 1994; Sidanius
et al., 2004) and that SDO may be particularly relevant for realistic threat perceptions
(e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Thomsen et al., 2008), it was hypothesized that higher
levels of SDO would predict Islamophobia, with realistic threat perceptions partially
mediating this relationship. Specifically, it was expected that those with higher levels of
SDO would be more likely to report perceptions of Muslims as a realistic threat, which
would increase levels of Islamophobia (see Figure 3).
Figure 3
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 1a

Note. See figure 2 for full hypothesized model.
Hypothesis 1b. Since research suggests that RWA also predicts intergroup bias
(e.g., Johnson et al., 2012; Rowatt et al., 2005) and that it may be particularly relevant for
symbolic threat perceptions (e.g., Crowson, 2009), it was hypothesized that RWA would
predict Islamophobia with symbolic threat perceptions partially mediating this
relationship. Specifically, it was expected that those with higher levels of RWA would be
more likely to report perceptions of Muslims as a symbolic threat, which would increase
levels of Islamophobia (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 1b

Note. See figure 2 for full hypothesized model.
Hypothesis 1c. Given research suggesting that Nationalism predicts intergroup
bias (Ayub & Jehn, 2010) and the theoretical correspondence between Nationalism and
terroristic threat perceptions (e.g., Andersen et al., 2012; Yogeeswaran et al., 2019), it
was hypothesized that Nationalism would predict Islamophobia with terroristic threat
perceptions partially mediating this relationship. Specifically, it was expected that those
with higher levels of Nationalism would be more likely to report perceptions of Muslims
as a terroristic threat which would increase levels of Islamophobia (see Figure 5).
Figure 5
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 1c

Note. See figure 2 for full hypothesized model.
Hypothesis 1d. Based on research suggesting that individual differences in
ideology, threat perceptions, and Islamophobia may all impact levels of support for
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discriminatory policies (e.g., Elsheikh et al., 2017; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Swami et
al., 2018), it was expected that Islamophobia would mediate the relationships between
individual differences, threat perceptions, and support for anti-Muslim policies (e.g.,
increasing surveillance of Muslim communities in the United States). Specifically, it was
expected that Islamophobia would act as a mediator between threat perceptions and
policy support, such that those with higher levels of perceived threats would be more
likely to hold higher levels of Islamophobia, and subsequently, be more likely to support
anti-Muslim policies (see Figure 6). This is consistent with previous work suggesting that
threat perceptions predict bias toward other groups and behavioral outcomes such as
support for policies that would impact relevant groups (Rios et al., 2018; Stephan et al.,
2015). Thus, in total, it was expected that higher levels of each individual difference in
ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, Nationalism) would differentially predict higher levels of
each threat perception (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic), which would predict higher
levels of Islamophobia and subsequently, increased support for anti-Muslim policies. The
ideology-threat-attitude-behavior order of predictions in the model is consistent with
research implicating threat perceptions as mediators between individual differences and
attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., 2017, Stephen et al., 2015; Uenal,
2016).
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Figure 6
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 1d

Note. See figure 2 for full hypothesized model.
Aim 2
Similar to previous research investigating the role of threat perceptions in
emotional reactions (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), cluster analysis techniques were used to
explore the emotional components of threat perceptions of Muslims. This type of analysis
is an example of unsupervised learning in which the goal is not prediction, but rather to
discover interesting patterns in a given dataset (James et al., 2013). Cluster analysis refers
to a wide range of techniques that detect clusters by partitioning them into discrete groups
in which components within a cluster are similar to one another but dissimilar to
components within other clusters (James et al., 2013). Aim 2 also consisted of 3 subhypotheses (2a-2c) that were planned to be tested in the event that the cluster analyses
from the exploratory hypothesis resulted in unclear or theoretically inconsistent clusters
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of emotions (e.g., fear and distrust clustering together, all emotions cluster into a single
cluster, results of each cluster analysis vary substantially) and prevented the testing of
threat perceptions as predictors of emotion clusters. In this case, regression analyses
would be completed with single-item measures of theoretically relevant emotional
reactions (i.e., anger, distrust, fear) and compared for fit.
Exploratory Hypothesis. Although exploratory in nature, previous work
investigating the emotional components of several types of threat perceptions allowed for
a general hypothesis for my exploratory analyses. Specifically, based on the work of
Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) and Gervais and colleagues (2011), it was expected that
symbolic threat perceptions would be characterized by and predict emotions such as
distrust and disgust. Given that previous work (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) combined
realistic and terroristic threats in their investigations, less clear hypotheses could be
made. Still, considering research which suggests that perceptions of challenge and
competition, which are conceptually similar to power, or realistic threat perceptions, may
lead to anger, whereas threats to physical safety which are conceptually similar to
terroristic threat perceptions, may lead to fear (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Lerner et
al., 2003), it was expected that realistic threats would predict feelings of anger and that
terroristic threats would predict feelings of fear.
To determine which emotions cluster with which threat perceptions, several
clustering approaches were used. First, k-means cluster analysis was used to determine
how emotions cluster with k (i.e., the number of clusters) set to 3 in order to map onto the
three threat perception measures being used. This iterative approach is useful for
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theoretically based questions in which the expected number of non-overlapping clusters
can be determined (James et al., 2013). Following this approach, hierarchical cluster
analysis was used to get a more robust picture of the emotion clusters. This approach
differs from k-means clustering in that k is not set a priori, but rather determined through
the visualization of a dendrogram that presents all of the possible clusters for any number
of total clusters from 1-n (James et al., 2013). The solutions in which the within-cluster
variation was minimized would then be selected from each technique (i.e., k-means and
hierarchical cluster analysis) and compared to determine the best fit for the emotion
cluster structure, overall.
Although one approach could have been to include threat perceptions in the
cluster analyses to determine where the threat perceptions cluster with each emotion, the
fact that these threat perceptions are often correlated (i.e., people who perceive one type
of threat are likely to perceive the other types of threats) means that including threat
perceptions in the data-driven clustering approach would likely have convoluted the
results of the cluster analyses. To avoid this complication, the resulting emotion clusters
were planned to be used as outcome variables in a series of regression analyses in order
to determine which threat perceptions (i.e., symbolic, realistic, terroristic) best predict
each emotion cluster.
Hypothesis 2a. Based on previous work looking at the emotional components of
resource-based threat perceptions, it was expected that realistic threat perceptions would
predict feelings of anger (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).
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Hypothesis 2b. Although disgust has been shown to impact attitudes toward
Muslims (Wirtz et al., 2015), other research suggests that distrust may be a more relevant
emotional reaction when groups are perceived as violating religious values such as
morality (Gervais et al., 2011). Based on these findings and the emphasis of perceived
threats to western values of the symbolic threat measure used, it was expected that
symbolic threat perceptions would predict feelings of distrust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005;
Gervais et al., 2011).
Hypothesis 2c. Based on previous work looking at the emotional components of
safety-based threat perceptions, it was expected that terroristic threat perceptions would
predict feelings of fear (Lerner et al., 2003).
Depending on the conclusions of the exploratory hypothesis, regression analyses
using either the emotion cluster or the theoretically based discrete emotion predictions
(hypotheses 2a-2c) were to be compared for fit using R2 and Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) estimates, where Y = each emotion cluster or outcome (i.e., realistic
cluster or anger, symbolic cluster or distrust, and terroristic cluster or fear), r = realistic
threat perceptions, s = symbolic threat perceptions, and t = terroristic threat perceptions:
Yrc/a = b0 + X1r + e1
Ysc/d = b0 + X1s + e2
Ytc/f = b0 + X1t + e3
Aim 3
Aim 3 consists of 3 sub-hypotheses (3a-3c). Overall, it was expected that threat
perceptions would predict threat-based emotional reactions which would predict support
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for anti-Muslim policies, representing a threat-emotion-behavior model of anti-Muslim
bias (see Figure 7). Similar to aim 1, SEM was used to simultaneously test hypotheses
3a-3c. This technique is useful for estimating predictive relationships between multiple
variables within a single model as it accounts for covariances between exogenous (i.e.,
predictive) variables (Kline, 2015). This is particularly useful given the expected
correlations between each type of perceived threat. Similar to the first structural equation
model, the role of each emotion cluster (i.e., realistic cluster, symbolic cluster, terroristic
cluster) or discrete emotion (i.e., anger, distrust, fear) in mediating the relationships
between threat perceptions and anti-Muslim policy support was examined by comparing
the strengths of each mediational path. This model was tested separately from the first
structural equation model which investigates more general attitudes toward Muslims (i.e.,
Islamophobia) in order to develop a better understanding of the mediating roles of
specific emotions in the relationship between threat perceptions and anti-Muslim policy.
This was tested separately from the first structural equation model for both theoretical
and practical reasons. First, although there is evidence to suggest that threat perceptions
predict emotional reactions, to my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence indicating
whether emotions would predict or be predicted by Islamophobia, making the structure of
a combined model unclear. Additionally, since the definition of Islamophobia is largely
based on fear toward Muslims and the religion of Islam, including both Islamophobia and
emotions toward Muslims, such as fear, would likely have introduced redundancy into
the model. More practically, increasing the number of variables and paths to be estimated
in the model would have increased model complexity which can have adverse effects on
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power. For these reasons, two structural equation models were tested separately to
determine 1) the role of individual differences in predicting anti-Muslim attitudes and
policy support through perceived threat, and 2) the role of perceived threat on antiMuslim policy support through distinct emotional reactions.
Figure 7
Aim 3 Full Model

Note. Full hypothesized structural equation model for aim 3 with all paths included.
Hypothesis 3a. Research suggests that threat perceptions predict different
emotional reactions, which may lead to different evaluative and behavioral outcomes,
such as support for discriminatory policies toward a number of groups (e.g., Cottrell &
Neuberg, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Therefore, it was
hypothesized that realistic threat perceptions would predict support for anti-Muslim
policies through its associated emotional components, which was determined in the
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exploratory hypothesis and hypotheses 2a-2c outlined above. Specifically, higher levels
of realistic threat perceptions were expected to predict increased support for an antiMuslim policy regarding Muslim surveillance with this relationship partially mediated by
increased levels of the realistic emotion cluster or anger (see Figure 8).
Figure 8
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 3a

Note. See figure 7 for full hypothesized model.
Hypothesis 3b. Similar to hypothesis 3a, it was expected that higher levels of
symbolic threat perceptions would predict increased support for an anti-Muslim policy
regarding Muslim surveillance and that this relationship would be partially mediated by
increased levels of the symbolic emotion cluster or distrust (see Figure 9).
Figure 9
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 3b

Note. See figure 7 for full hypothesized model.
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Hypothesis 3c. It was hypothesized that higher levels of terroristic threat
perceptions would predict increased support for an anti-Muslim policy regarding Muslim
surveillance and that this relationship would be partially mediated by increased levels of
the terroristic emotion cluster or fear (see Figure 10).
Figure 10
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 3c

Note. See figure 7 for full hypothesized model.
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Method
Power Analyses
The current study primarily used structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the
various hypotheses. Given the flexible nature of structural equation modeling and the
model-dependent nature of a priori power analyses, there are not currently clear
guidelines on how to conduct a priori power analyses using well-established tools, such
as G*Power (Faul et al., 2007). Guidelines about the minimum number of participants
necessary for adequate power (Wolf et al., 2013), as well as previous research testing
similar types of mediational structural equation models (Uenal, 2016) suggest that a
sample size of at least 200 is sufficient to detect small to medium effects (.10 - .50) with a
power level of .80. In addition to these guidelines, an online SEM power calculator
(Zhang & Yuan, 2018) based on the suggestions of Satorra and Saris (1985) was used to
determine the sample size necessary to detect a small effect (.10) with a power level of
.80. This calculator is based on the Chi-square test. The results of these power analyses
indicated that a minimum sample size of 138 for the first structural equation model (i.e.,
hypotheses 1a-1d) and a minimum sample size of 110 for the second structural equation
model would be adequate to detect small to medium effects at a power level of .80.
Additionally, data simulation based on pilot data was used to better determine the ability
to detect effects within the proposed models with various sample sizes. Based on these
analyses, 500 participants were recruited to ensure a conservative sample size for all
measures of interest after data reduction due to non-responding on certain items or early
exit from the survey.
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Participants
Three-hundred and sixty-one participants were collected through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and 336 participants were collected through Portland State
University (PSU) for a total of 697 participants. All recruitment was completely online
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants were recruited from these two populations
in order to ensure a politically diverse enough sample. Although student samples tend to
be more liberal than the general population, samples collected from MTurk tend to be
more politically diverse and show similar reliability to more traditional sampling methods
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Feitosa et al., 2015; Johnson & Borden, 2012). Given that
several hypotheses were related to individual differences that are often associated with
political orientation, the distributions of political ideology across samples were examined
for normality to assess whether more targeted participant recruitment was required prior
to hypothesis testing. As expected, when comparing the PSU and MTurk samples, there
was a significant difference in political orientation with PSU participants being more
liberal on average (M = 5.58, SD = 1.30) compared to MTurk participants (M = 4.54, SD
= 1.92), t(608) = -7.73, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.31, -0.78]. Overall, the distribution of the
combined sample was relatively normally distributed, however, with an average of 5.02
(SD = 1.74) and a skewness value of -0.75 which is well below the recommended
absolute value of 2 (Gravetter et al., 2020). Although a greater proportion of the full
sample reported being slightly to very liberal (64.2% compared to 16.9% moderate and
18.8% slightly to very conservative), more conservative participants were not recruited
based on the overall normal distribution.
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PSU students were recruited through online course announcements by their
instructors in classes across several academic departments between September and
December of 2020. MTurk participants were recruited through the Cloud Research
Toolkit platform on September 19th, October 4th, and October 19th of 2020. Participant
recruitment was conducted over the course of several weeks and months in part to
address the tumultuous and variable social and political climate in the United States
surrounding the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the spike in Black Lives Matter protests
across the country, and the 2020 presidential election. Given that no major events specific
to Muslims in the United States or updates with the Muslim ban occurred during data
collection, it was hoped that spreading out data collection aided in drowning out the
potential for political events to impact responses to the current study. As with any study,
however, findings should be considered within the historical and social context in which
they are based.
Precautions were taken to ensure that robotic accounts were not able to access the
survey through MTurk, including the use of a Completely Automated Public Turing test
to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA). Geographic locations were restricted
to the United States given that the hypotheses concerned attitudes of those living in the
United States, specifically. Several data cleaning measures were taken prior to analyses.
Thirty-seven participants were removed for failing to take the survey or complete the
measures of interest beyond the demographics. Out of the remaining participants, 9 were
removed for identifying as Muslims, and 1 participant was removed for being under the
age of 18. No participants reported residing outside of the United States. An additional 16
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participants were removed due to duplicate IP addresses. Finally, 31 participants were
removed for failing an attention check item. The final sample consisted of 603
participants (346 women, 234 men, 13 nonbinary, 4 other) with an average age of about
35 years (M = 34.7, SD = 14.1). Overall, the sample was predominantly White (394
White, 41 Black, 48 Latin-o/a/x, 60 Asian, 45 multiracial, and 14 other), and slightly
liberal, although political orientation was still relatively normally distributed (M = 5.01,
SD = 1.77).
Procedure
After completing the informed consent, participants completed a series of
questionnaires measuring social attitudes including SDO (Ho et al., 2015), RWA
(Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 2007), and Nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989).
Participants also completed measures indicating their level of each type of perceived
threat of Muslims (Uenal, 2016), emotional reactions toward Muslims (Cottrell &
Neuberg, 2005), level of Islamophobia (Lee et al., 2013), and support for several policies
that restrict the rights of Muslims in the United States. Finally, participants read about the
proposal of a senate bill that would allow police officers in the United States to stop and
question anyone leaving a mosque who appears suspicious (see Appendix for full survey
measures).
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Measures
Social Attitudes
Participants began by completing several scales intended to assess a number of
social attitudes, including SDO (Ho et al., 2015), RWA (Manganelli Rattazzi et al.,
2007), and Nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989).
Social Dominance Orientation. SDO was measured using a shortened Social
Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO7; Ho et al., 2015) which consists of eight items
measuring two subdimensions: dominance (SDO-D) and egalitarianism (SDO-E).
Generally, SDO indicates one’s support of existing social hierarchies that place certain
groups of people above or below others (Pratto et al., 2006; Pratto et al., 1994), with the
dominance subscale representing beliefs in active oppression of subordinate groups by
dominant groups, and the egalitarianism subscale representing beliefs in the maintenance
of social inequality (Ho et al., 2015). All items were measured on a 7-point Likert-style
scale with higher values indicating more endorsement of each item (1-Strongly Disagree,
7-Strongly Agree). Example items include, “An ideal society requires some groups to be
on top and others to be on the bottom” (dominance), and “We should work to give all
groups an equal chance to succeed” (egalitarianism, reverse-coded). Based on the goals
of the current study to understand the role of both SDO-D and SDO-E in predicting
perceptions of Muslims and subsequent policy support, an average of the full SDO 7 scale
was used for analyses, α = .88.
Right-wing Authoritarianism. RWA was measured using a shortened version of
the RWA scale which consists of two subdimensions: aggression and submission, and
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conservatism (Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 2007). Fourteen items were measured on a 7point Likert-style scale with higher values indicating more endorsement of each item (1Strongly Disagree, 7-Strongly Agree). Example items include “Obedience and respect for
authority are the most important values children should learn,” (aggression and
submission), and “Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual
preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else” (conservatism, reversecoded). This scale can be used by aggregating the full scale or each subdimensions
depending on the specific hypotheses being tested (e.g., if they are related to one aspect
of RWA, specifically, or levels of RWA, generally). Based on the goals of the current
study to understand the role of both RWA aggression and submission and RWA
conservatism, an average of the full RWA scale was used for analyses, α = .94.
Nationalism. Nationalism was measured using the Nationalism subscale of the
Patriotism/Nationalism Questionnaire (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). This subscale
represents the view that the United States is superior and should be dominant over other
countries. All eight items were measured on a 7-point Likert-style scale with one item
reverse-coded so that higher values indicated more endorsement of each item (1-Strongly
Disagree, 7-Strongly Agree). Example items include, “Generally, the more influence
America has on other nations, the better off they are,” and “Other countries should try to
make their governments as much like ours as possible.” Based on the hypotheses related
to Nationalism and its ethnocentric components, specifically, only the Nationalism
subscale of the broader Patriotism/Nationalism Questionnaire was used, α = .91.
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Intergroup Bias
Participants completed another series of questions intended to measure intergroup
bias, including perceived threats posed by Muslims (Uenal, 2016), emotional responses
toward Muslims (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), level of Islamophobia (Lee et al., 2013), and
support of discriminatory policies against Muslims.
Threat Perceptions. Realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions toward
Muslims were assessed using a measure adapted from Uenal (2016). Realistic threat
perceptions represent threats to one’s resources or social status, with an example item
being, “Because of the presence of Muslims in the United States, Americans have more
difficulties finding a job,” α = .95. Symbolic threat perceptions represent threats to one’s
moral or worldview, with an example item being, “I am worried that the American norms
and values are threatened by the presence of Muslims,” α = .97. Finally, terroristic threat
perceptions represent threats to one’s physical safety or security, with an example item
being, “It is only a matter of time before the United States will become a target for
Islamist terrorists,” α = .90. All eleven items were measured on a 7-point Likert-style
scale with higher values indicating more perceived threat (1-Strongly Disagree, 7Strongly Agree). Threat perceptions were aggregated separately to create three scores that
represent levels of each type of perceived threat.
Emotional Reactions. Emotional reactions toward Muslims were measured using
items from Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) which assess levels of several different emotions
in response to different groups of people. These emotional reactions have been shown to
predict intergroup bias in previous research (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Gervais et
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al., 2011). An example item for this scale would be “When I think about Muslims, I feel
[fear, anger, distrust, disgust, anxiety, envy, pity, guilt].” All items were measured on a 5point Likert-style scale with higher values indicating higher levels of that emotion (1-Not
at all, 5-Extremely). Based on a sociofunctional approach to prejudice that suggests
certain emotions are representative of different kinds of perceived threats (Cottrell &
Neuberg, 2005; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011), separate scores for each emotional
reaction were used in analyses. Positive emotions were not measured as they were not
expected to be representative of the negative types of perceived threats being investigated
in the current study and have typically not been used in previous analyses investigating
the emotional components of threat perceptions (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).
Islamophobia. Levels of Islamophobia were measured with the Islamophobia
scale which measures feelings of fear toward Muslims and Islam (Lee et al., 2013). This
scale consists of items relating to anti-Muslim attitudes (e.g., “If I could, I would avoid
contact with Muslims.”) and anti-Islam attitudes (e.g., “Islam is a dangerous religion”).
All items were measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale with higher values indicating
higher levels of Islamophobia (1-Strongly Disagree, 7-Strongly Agree). Items were
aggregated to create an average measure of Islamophobia including both anti-Muslim and
anti-Islam attitudes, α = .98.
Policy Support. Endorsement of discriminatory policies was assessed by having
participants report their level of agreement with three statements about different policy
initiatives, as well as responding to a “recently proposed bill” that would increase
surveillance of Muslim communities by the police. The anti-Muslim policy measure used
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for aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) consisted of three policy initiative items that were measured
on a 7-point Likert-style scale with higher values indicating more agreement with each
statement (1-Strongly Disagree, 7-Strongly Agree). The three items included, “I would
support a policy to require government surveillance of all U.S. mosques”, “I would
support a policy banning the entry of all Muslims into the United States”, and “I would
support state universities limiting enrollment by members of racial and religious groups
in proportion to their percentage of the state’s population.” These items were averaged to
provide a composite score of general support for anti-Muslim policies, α = .94. Although
the item regarding university enrollment comes from previous work (Nobles & Nobles,
1954, as cited in Andersen et al., 2012), the lack of empirical research on policies relating
to Muslims specifically led to the self-development of the remaining two items based on
proposed and actual policies in the United States (Al Jazeera, 2020; CRC, 2018; 2020).
For the anti-Muslim policy outcome used for aim 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c), participants read
a short paragraph describing a fictitious bill that was recently proposed to increase police
surveillance of mosques and Muslim community centers (see Appendix). This bill was
based on activities of the covert NYPD Demographics Unit which were revealed in 2011
(Apuzzo & Goldman, 2011a; 2011b; Apuzzo et al., 2011). This paragraph outlined a
recent bill (S.B. 5483) that was scheduled for a vote by the Senate and would enable local
police to follow and question anyone seen leaving a mosque or Muslim community
center with “reasonable suspicion”. This was followed by a series of questions regarding
the participant’s thoughts and feelings about the passing of that bill which were
aggregated into an average score indicating support for the proposed bill (e.g., “The
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passing of this bill will make the United States safer”; 1-Strongly Disagree, 7-Strongly
Agree; α = .91).
Demographics
Participants completed demographic information including their racial and ethnic
identity, gender identity, religious identity, age, and political ideology (see Appendix).
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Results
Preliminary Analyses
Univariate normality was assessed using boxplots which showed positively
skewed distributions with some potential outliers on almost all of the variables of interest.
Although positively skewed, most of the skewness and kurtosis values were below 2
(Gravetter & Wallnau, 2014) with the exception of the general anti-Muslim policy
measure (kurtosis = 2.14). Given the nature of the distribution and the fact that these
variables were measured on a restricted range of 1-7, the identified potential outliers were
retained. Potential multivariate outliers were detected using Mahalanobis Distance using
the variables of interest in each model. Most participants were identified as potential
multivariate outliers for both aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) and aim 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c).
Given the large number of variables included in each model and the skew observed in the
univariate distributions, all participants from the reduced sample described in the
methods section were retained for all analyses.
The fact that almost all participants were identified as multivariate outliers
suggests that the assumption of multivariate normality was violated. To follow up on this,
Mardia’s test of multivariate normality was conducted (Korkmaz et al., 2014). The results
of this test confirmed the suspicion that multivariate normality could not be assumed in
the analyses, warranting consideration when interpreting results 1. The assumptions of

1

Both structural equation models were also run with maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard
errors and a scaled test statistic due to the violation of multivariate normality. These more conservative
estimates did not change any of the interpretations of findings in either direction of relationships or changes
to significance levels. Thus, the reported analyses are based on the originally planned estimation method
(i.e., full information maximum likelihood with bootstrapped standard errors).
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homoscedasticity and multicollinearity were also assessed using QQ plots and variance
inflation factors (VIF). All QQ plots showed acceptable levels of homoscedasticity
except for the emotional reactions which appeared somewhat abnormal, suggesting some
heteroscedasticity. VIF values were computed for both structural equation models. All
VIF values for the first SEM were well below 10, suggesting that there were no
multicollinearity issues with the variables included in SEM 1 (i.e., SDO, RWA,
Nationalism, realistic threats, symbolic threats, terroristic threats, Islamophobia, and
support for anti-Muslim policies). Most VIF values for the second SEM were below 10,
with about 63 values indicating potential multicollinearity issues between the variables in
SEM 2 (i.e., realistic threats, symbolic threats, terroristic threats, anger, distrust, and fear,
and support for surveillance-specific anti-Muslim policy). Given the addition of the
emotional reaction variables in SEM 2, it may be that the emotional reactions measured
overlap conceptually to an extent, and thus, the values were retained for analyses with
this consideration in mind.
Descriptive Statistics
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the variables of interest in the
first SEM, the cluster analysis, and the second SEM can be found in Tables 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. As expected, SDO, RWA, Nationalism, and all perceptions of threat (i.e.,
realistic, symbolic, and terroristic) were moderately, positively correlated with one
another with correlation coefficients ranging between .46 and .85 (see Table 1).
Differences in the magnitude of correlations between SDO, RWA, and Nationalism and
each type of threat perception were relatively small, suggesting that all of these variables
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are moderately correlated with one another. Each of these variables was also moderately,
positively related to Islamophobia and both policy measures (see Tables 1 and 3). Finally,
emotional reactions toward Muslims were all positively correlated. Fear, anger, distrust,
disgust, and anxiety were all strongly correlated with correlation coefficients ranging
between .70 and .85. Pity, envy, and guilt showed moderate correlations with one another
(correlation coefficients between .42 and .58) and small to moderate correlations with
fear, anger, distrust, disgust, and anxiety (correlation coefficients between .10 and .35;
see Table 2).
Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Aim 1 Structural Equation Model
1

2

3

4

5

6

1. SDO

-

2. RWA

.61***

3. Nationalism

.55*** .77***

4. Realistic

.63*** .67*** .65***

5. Symbolic

.57*** .67*** .62*** .85***

6. Terroristic

.45*** .51*** .54*** .69*** .77***

7. Islamophobia

.58*** .63*** .61*** .85*** .89*** .74***

7

8

M

SD

2.16 1.13
-

2.78 1.32
-

2.84 1.37
-

1.96 1.39
-

2.15 1.67
-

2.91 1.77
-

2.14 1.56

8. Policy Support .58*** .67*** .65*** .81*** .80*** .64*** .88*** - 1.97 1.55
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations,
1
2
1. Fear
2. Anger
.82***
3. Distrust .83*** .79***
4. Disgust .74*** .85***
5. Anxiety .85*** .75***
6. Pity
.27*** .29***
7. Guilt
.19*** .19***
8. Envy
.31*** .32***

and Correlations Aim 2 Cluster Analyses
3
4
5
6
7
8

.76***
.79*** .70***
.26*** .28***
.10* .15**
.25*** .33***

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

M
1.8
1.64
1.91
1.58
1.71
.32***
1.64
.23*** .47***
1.45
.35*** .42*** .58*** - 1.18

SD
1.14
1.08
1.22
1.05
1.07
1.05
0.91
0.58
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Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Aim 3 Structural Equation Model
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 M
SD
1. Realistic
1.96 1.39
2. Symbolic
.85***
2.15 1.67
3. Terroristic
.69*** .77***
2.91 1.77
4. Anger
.60*** .63*** .52***
1.64 1.08
5. Distrust
.58*** .65*** .58*** .79***
1.91 1.22
6. Fear
.58*** .62*** .57*** .82*** .83***
1.8 1.14
7. Surveillance
Policy Support .71*** .68*** .53*** .42*** .42*** .42*** - 2.02 1.28
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Hypothesis Testing
Aim 1: Hypotheses 1a-1d
Aim 1 of the current study investigated the roles of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism
in predicting realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions, Islamophobia, and
anti-Muslim policy support. Structural equation modeling was used to simultaneously test
hypotheses 1a-d in a single model using maximum likelihood estimation in the lavaan
package in R (Rosseel, 2012). All indirect effects were tested using 500 bootstrapped
standard errors based on simulations used to determine how many bootstrapped standard
errors were needed to stabilize the standard errors for each path. Specifically, this model
tested the hypotheses that a) SDO predicts Islamophobia through perceived realistic
threats about Muslims, b) RWA predicts Islamophobia through perceived symbolic
threats about Muslims, c) Nationalism predicts Islamophobia through perceived
terroristic threats about Muslims, and d) Islamophobia mediates the relationships between
threat perceptions (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic) and support for policies that
discriminate against Muslims (e.g., support for a Muslim ban) while controlling for
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participant political orientation and gender 2. Given the validated nature of the scales used
in this study, this model utilized observed variables rather than taking a latent approach to
modeling which incorporates the measurement model. Although the chi-square value was
significant, 𝜒2 (9) = 61.59, p < .01, suggesting poor fit to the data, alternative fit indices
were also examined to determine whether the fit was adequate. Overall, the structural
equation model showed good fit to the data (CFI = .98, SRMR = .02) based on standards
suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999) for a good fitting model of at least .95 for the CFI fit
index and at most .08 for the SMSR fit index. A post hoc power analysis using the
semPower package in R (Moshagen & Erdfelder, 2016)3 indicated that a power level of
.99 was achieved for this model.
In terms of hypothesis testing, several specific hypotheses for aim 1 were
confirmed while others were not (see Figure 11). In partial support of hypothesis 1a,
results indicated that SDO directly predicted realistic threat perceptions, b = .40, SE =
.06, 𝛽 = .33, p < .001 but not Islamophobia, b = .10, SE = .05, 𝛽 = .07, ns, when
accounting for the multiple mediators included in the model (i.e., realistic, symbolic, and

2

Both the SEM for aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) and aim 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c) were also tested with
participant sub-sample (i.e., PSU or MTurk) included as a covariate to ensure the sampling method did not
impact the results. The inclusion of this covariate did not change the direction of effects or interpretation of
findings. The only change in path significance was for the indirect path between RWA and Islamophobia
through perceived terroristic threat in the aim 1 SEM which still trended in the same direction but became
marginally significant in the model including this additional covariate.
3
Due to complications in utilizing the same SEM power calculator used for a priori power analyses for post
hoc power analyses, a newer and more recently updated tool was identified. This package has undergone
more vetting by the Comprehensive R Archive Network and may be more reliable than the tool used for a
priori analyses. To compare the tools, mock “a priori” power analyses for both SEMs were conducted
based on the parameters used in the original a priori power analyses. Results suggested that while an
adequate sample was collected to detect an effect for SEM 1, the sample size may be too small for SEM 2,
resulting in an underpowered model. It should be noted that this power is specific to model fit coefficients,
however, and not path coefficients.
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terroristic threat perceptions). Further, the indirect effect of SDO on Islamophobia
through realistic threat perceptions was significant, b = .11, SE = .03, 𝛽 = .08, p < .01,
95% CI [0.05, 0.17], suggesting that as levels of SDO increased, perceived realistic threat
of Muslims increased, which in turn, predicted higher levels of Islamophobia. The
indirect effect between SDO and Islamophobia through realistic threat perceptions was
slightly smaller than the indirect effects between SDO and Islamophobia through
symbolic, b = .16, SE = .04, 𝛽 = .12, p < .001, 95% CI [0.07, 0.24], and larger than the
indirect effects between SDO and Islamophobia through terroristic threat perceptions, b =
.02, SE = .01, 𝛽 = .02, p < .05, 95% CI [0.00, 0.04].
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In support of hypothesis 1b, RWA predicted symbolic threat perceptions, b = .46,
SE = .09, 𝛽 = .36, p < .001, but not Islamophobia, b = -.05, SE = .05, 𝛽 = -.04, ns. The
indirect effect of RWA on Islamophobia through symbolic threat perceptions, however,
was significant, b = .23, SE = .05, 𝛽 = .20, p < .001, 95% CI [0.13, 0.33], suggesting that
as levels of RWA increased, perceived symbolic threat of Muslims increased, which in
turn, predicted higher levels of Islamophobia. The indirect effect between RWA and
Islamophobia through symbolic threat perceptions was stronger than the indirect effects
between RWA and Islamophobia through realistic, b = .07, SE = .02, 𝛽 = .06, p < .01,
95% CI [0.02, 0.12], or terroristic threat perceptions, b = .02, SE = .01, 𝛽 = .02, p < .05,
95% CI [0.00, 0.05].
In partial support of hypothesis 1c, Nationalism predicted terroristic threat
perceptions, b = .41, SE = .09, 𝛽 = .32, p < .001, but not Islamophobia, b = .04, SE = .04,

𝛽 = .03, ns. The indirect effect of Nationalism on Islamophobia through terroristic threat
perceptions, however, was significant, b = .04, SE = .02, 𝛽 = .04, p < .05, 95% CI [0.01,
0.07], suggesting that as levels of Nationalism increased, perceived terroristic threat of
Muslims increased, which in turn, predicted higher levels of Islamophobia. The indirect
effect between Nationalism and Islamophobia through terroristic threat perceptions was
smaller than the indirect effects between Nationalism and Islamophobia through realistic,
b = .08, SE = .03, 𝛽 = .07, p < .01, 95% CI [0.02, 0.15], and symbolic threat perceptions,
b = .15, SE = .04, 𝛽 = .13, p < .001, 95% CI [0.07, 0.21].
In support of hypothesis 1d, Islamophobia was predicted by realistic, b = .28, SE
= .07, 𝛽 = .25, p < .001, symbolic, b = .50, SE = .06, 𝛽 = .54, p < .001, and terroristic
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threat perceptions, b = .10, SE = .03, 𝛽 = .11, p < .01, and anti-Muslim policy support
was predicted by Islamophobia, b = .68, SE = .08, 𝛽 = .68, p < .001. Further,
Islamophobia significantly mediated the relationships between realistic, b = .19, SE = .05,

𝛽 = .17, p < .001, 95% CI [0.10, 0.28], symbolic, b = .34, SE = .05, 𝛽 = .37, p < .001,
95% CI [0.24, 0.45], and terroristic threat perceptions, b = .07, SE = .03, 𝛽 =.08, p < .01,
95% CI [0.02, 0.12], and anti-Muslim policy support, suggesting that as each type of
perceived threat increased, feelings of Islamophobia increased, which then lead to
increased support for anti-Muslim policies.
Together, these findings largely supported hypothesis 1 that SDO, RWA, and
Nationalism each predict Islamophobia through several types of perceived threat (i.e.,
realistic, symbolic, and terroristic) which subsequently predicts support for anti-Muslim
policies (e.g., Muslim ban). One deviation from the expected findings was that the
indirect effects of each type of perceived threat did not vary substantially in size from
each predictor (e.g., SDO, RWA) to Islamophobia. For example, the indirect effect of
realistic threat perceptions on the relationship between SDO and Islamophobia was
slightly weaker than that of symbolic threat perceptions but slightly stronger than that of
terroristic threat perceptions. This indirect effect may be driven by the stronger effect of
symbolic threats on Islamophobia given that each ideological difference variable directly
predicted the expected type of threat perception better than the other ideological
difference variables (i.e., SDO best predicted realistic threats, RWA best predicted
symbolic threats, Nationalism best predicted terroristic threats). These differences were
small, however, and would likely not hold much practical significance even if the
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differences were statistically significantly different. Rather, the pattern of findings that
each of these types of threat perceptions acted as mediators between each of the
individual difference characteristic (i.e., SDO, RWA, and Nationalism) while accounting
for the effects of one another suggests that these ideological constructs are likely to
independently facilitate perceived threats to one’s resources, values, and safety (see Table
4 for all direct and indirect effects). Further, the finding that Islamophobia simultaneously
mediated the relationships between realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions
and anti-Muslim policy support suggested that perceived threats influenced both general
intergroup attitudes (i.e., Islamophobia) and more specific behavioral intentions that
would negatively impact specific groups (i.e., anti-Muslim policy support). Overall, the
full model accounted for about 80% of the variance in anti-Muslim policy support (r2 =
.80; see Figure 12 for all significant direct effects).

.19 (.05)***
.34 (.06)***
.07 (.03)**

.07 (.03)**
.08 (.03)**
.16 (.04)***
.23 (.05)***
.15 (.04)**
.02 (.01)*
.02 (.01)
.04 (.02)*
-

RWA > Realistic
NAT > Realistic
SDO > Symbolic
RWA > Symbolic
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Aim 2: Exploratory Hypothesis and Hypotheses 2a-2c
The second aim of this study attempted to determine the emotional components of
distinct types of threat perceptions. Aim 2 consisted of both a data-driven exploratory
hypothesis and a theory-based hypothesis in the event that the results of the exploratory
hypothesis were unclear. Several clustering approaches were used in order to determine
which emotions clustered with which threat perceptions. First, k-means cluster analysis
was used to determine how emotions cluster with the number of clusters set to 3 to map
onto the 3 threat perception measures used. Given that this is an iterative process that is
initially randomly configured, the k-means clustering approach was run approximately 25
times (James et al., 2013). Hierarchical cluster analysis was then used to get a more
robust picture of the emotion clusters using an average link dissimilarity based on
Euclidean distance (James et al., 2013). Visualization of the dendrogram presenting all of
the possible clusters suggested that a 2-cluster solution was more ideal than the 3-cluster
solution that was expected to emerge. Overall, the findings of the cluster analyses were
inconclusive with a large majority of participants clustering into the first cluster. Rather
than revealing clusters containing different discrete emotions, as was expected, the
resulting clusters appeared to represent the magnitude of endorsement of all emotional
reactions (i.e., low, medium, and high emotion endorsers), leaving it unclear how to
aggregate different emotions into broader categories as was intended. This helps explain
why most participants fell within the first cluster as the emotion variables were skewed
with most people reporting low endorsement of all emotional reactions toward Muslims.
Given that the interest in emotions involves the impact of categorically discrete types of
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emotion (e.g., anger as opposed to distrust), rather than the overall magnitude of emotion
endorsement, several theoretically relevant emotional reaction items were used as
observed variables in the regression models and SEM 2 (i.e., anger, distrust, and fear).
Based on the inconclusive results of the cluster analyses, the contingency plan
described previously was employed and hypotheses 2a-2c were tested to determine if
different types of threat perceptions better predicted emotions that should theoretically be
more or less related to different threats (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Gervais et al., 2011;
Lerner et al., 2003). A series of regression analyses were run and compared for fit with
the expectation that 1) realistic threat perceptions would best predict feelings of anger
compared to symbolic and terroristic threat perceptions, 2) symbolic threat perceptions
would best predict feelings of distrust compared to realistic and terroristic threat
perceptions, and 3) terroristic threat perceptions would best predict fear compared to
realistic and symbolic threat perceptions. Three non-nested models for each emotion (i.e.,
anger, distrust, and fear) were compared for fit using the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) to determine which type of perceived threat best predicted each emotion. Models
with lower BIC values are considered better fitting models. In general, differences that
are less than 2 are not considered practically meaningful, differences between 2 and 6
provide some evidence of a superior model, differences between 6 and 10 provide strong
evidence of a superior model, and differences larger than 10 provide very strong evidence
of a better fitting model (Fabozzi et al., 2014).
In partial support of hypothesis 2a, anger was predicted by realistic, b = .42, SE =
.03, 𝛽 =.59, p < .001, 95% CI [0.37, 0.48], BIC = 1079.94, symbolic, b = .37, SE = .02, 𝛽
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=.63, p < .001, 95% CI [0.33, 0.42], BIC = 1046.81, and terroristic threat perceptions, b =
.31, SE = .03, 𝛽 =.52, p < .001, 95% CI [0.26, 0.36], BIC = 1120.15 (see Table 5). In
contradiction to predictions, standardized coefficients suggested that anger was more
strongly predicted by realistic than terroristic threat perceptions but was more strongly
predicted by symbolic than realistic threat perceptions. Comparison of BIC values
suggested that symbolic threats predicting anger resulted in the best fitting model,
followed by realistic and terroristic threat perceptions, respectively. All BIC difference
values between the three models were greater than 10, providing strong evidence that
symbolic threat perceptions were a better predictor of anger toward Muslims than
realistic or terroristic threat perceptions.

In support of hypothesis 2b, distrust was also predicted by realistic, b = .47, SE =
.03, 𝛽 =.57, p < .001, 95% CI [0.40, 0.53], BIC = 1247.88, symbolic, b = .44, SE = .02, 𝛽
=.65, p < .001, 95% CI [0.39, 0.49], BIC = 1175.44, and terroristic threat perceptions, b =
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.39, SE = .03, 𝛽 =.58, p < .001, 95% CI [0.34, 0.44], BIC = 1237.69 (see Table 6). As
predicted, standardized coefficients suggested that distrust was more strongly predicted
by symbolic than realistic or terroristic threat perceptions. Further, the BIC value
indicated that this was the best fitting regression model. Comparison of BIC values
suggested that symbolic threats predicting distrust resulted in the best fitting model,
followed by terroristic and realistic threat perceptions, respectively. All BIC difference
values between the three models were greater than 10, providing strong evidence that
symbolic threat perceptions were a better predictor of distrust toward Muslims than
realistic or terroristic threat perceptions.

In partial support of hypothesis 2c, fear was predicted by realistic, b = .44, SE =
.03, 𝛽 =.58, p < .001, 95% CI [0.38, 0.50], BIC = 1173.79, symbolic, b = .39, SE = .02, 𝛽
=.61, p < .001, 95% CI [0.34, 0.44], BIC = 1138.29, and terroristic threat perceptions, b =
.36, SE = .03, 𝛽 =.57, p < .001, 95% CI [0.31, 0.41], BIC = 1168.65 (see Table 7).
Contrary to predictions, standardized coefficients suggested that fear was more strongly
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predicted by symbolic threat perceptions than realistic or terroristic threat perceptions.
Comparison of BIC values suggested that symbolic threats predicting fear resulted in the
best fitting model, followed by terroristic and realistic threat perceptions, respectively.
The BIC difference values between symbolic threat and both realistic and terroristic
threat perceptions were larger than 10, providing strong evidence that symbolic threat
perceptions were a better predictor of fear toward Muslims than realistic or terroristic
threat perceptions. The BIC difference value between realistic and terroristic threat
perceptions, however, was only 5.14, providing some evidence that terroristic threat
perceptions were a better predictor of fear than realistic threat perceptions.
Based on the small differences in standardized effect sizes between each type of
threat perception in predicting each emotion, these findings suggest that there is likely
overlap in the relationships between each type of perceived threat and emotional
responses to groups perceived as threatening. Additionally, given that symbolic threat
perceptions came out as a better predictor of each emotion than realistic or terroristic
threat perceptions, there is some evidence that symbolic threat perceptions may be more
likely to elicit several kinds of emotional responses compared to realistic or terroristic
threat perceptions.
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Aim 3: Hypotheses 3a-3c
As with aim 1, structural equation modeling was used to simultaneously test
hypotheses 3a-c in a single model using maximum likelihood estimation in the lavaan
package in R (Rosseel, 2012). All indirect effects were tested using 500 bootstrapped
standard errors. Specifically, this model tested the hypotheses that a) realistic threat
perceptions would predict support for anti-Muslim policies through anger, b) symbolic
threat perception would predict support for anti-Muslim policies through distrust, and c)
terroristic threat perceptions would predict support for anti-Muslim policies through fear
while controlling for participant political orientation and gender. This model utilized
observed variables rather than taking a latent approach to modeling which incorporates
the measurement model. Although the chi-square value was significant, 𝜒2 (6) = 15.92, p
< .05, suggesting poor fit to the data, alternative fit indices were also examined to
determine whether the fit was adequate. Overall, the structural equation model showed
good fit to the data (CFI = .99, SRMR = .02) based on standards suggested by Hu and
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Bentler (1999) for a good fitting model of at least .95 for the CFI fit index and at most .08
for the SMSR fit index. A post hoc power analysis using the semPower package in R
(Moshagen & Erdfelder, 2016) indicated that a power level of .64 was achieved for this
model.
In terms of hypothesis testing, several specific hypotheses for aim 3 were
confirmed while others were not (See Figure 13). In partial support of hypothesis 3a,
results indicated that realistic threat perceptions predicted both anger, b = .14, SE = .06, 𝛽
= .18, p < .05, and Muslim surveillance policy support, b = .39, SE = .07, 𝛽 = .41, p <
.001. The indirect effect of realistic threat perceptions on Muslim surveillance policy
support through anger, however, was not significant, b = -.01, SE = .01, 𝛽 = -.01, ns, 95%
CI [-0.03, 0.02], suggesting that while increased perceptions of realistic threats by
Muslims predicted both anger and support for a Muslim surveillance policy, the
relationship between realistic threat perceptions and policy support was not explained by
feelings of anger toward Muslims. The indirect effects between realistic threat
perceptions and Muslim surveillance policy support through distrust, b = -.002, SE = .01,

𝛽 = -.003, ns, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.01], and fear, b = .01, SE = .01, 𝛽 = .01, ns, 95% CI [0.02, 0.04], were also not significant.
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In partial support of hypothesis 3b, results indicated that symbolic threat
perceptions predicted both distrust, b = .29, SE = .07, 𝛽 = .41, p < .001, and Muslim
surveillance policy support, b = .18, SE = .07, 𝛽 = .23, p < .05. The indirect effect of
symbolic threat perceptions on Muslim surveillance policy support through distrust,
however, was not significant, b = -.01, SE = .02, 𝛽 = -.01, ns, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.04],
suggesting that while increased perceptions of symbolic threats by Muslims predicted
both distrust and support for a Muslim surveillance policy, the relationship between
symbolic threat perceptions and policy support was not explained by feelings of distrust
toward Muslims. The indirect effects between symbolic threat perceptions and Muslim
surveillance policy support through anger, b = -.01, SE = .02, 𝛽 = -.01, ns, 95% CI [-0.04,
0.03], and fear, b = .01, SE = .02, 𝛽 = .01, ns, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.04], were also not
significant.
In partial support of hypothesis 3c, results indicated that terroristic threat
perceptions predicted fear, b = .14, SE = .04, 𝛽 = .22, p < .001, but not Muslim
surveillance policy support, b = -.01, SE = .03, 𝛽 = -.01, ns. Further, the indirect effect of
terroristic threat perceptions on Muslim surveillance policy support through fear was not
significant, b = .01, SE = .01, 𝛽 = .01, ns, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.03], suggesting that while
increased perceptions of terroristic threats by Muslims predicted fear, they did not predict
support for a Muslim surveillance policy either directly or through feelings of fear. The
indirect effects between terroristic threat perceptions and Muslim surveillance policy
support through anger, b = -.001, SE = .004, 𝛽 = -.002, ns, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.01], and
distrust, b = -.01, SE = .01, 𝛽 = -.01, ns, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.02], were also not significant.
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Together, these findings leave hypothesis 3 largely unsupported. Consistent with
the hypothesized relationships, realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions all
directly predicted anger, distrust, and fear. Realistic and symbolic threat perceptions also
directly predicted Muslim surveillance policy support, but terroristic threat perceptions
did not. Further, emotional reactions toward Muslims did not mediate the relationships
between any type of perceived threat and Muslim surveillance policy support, which was
inconsistent with the hypotheses (see Table 8 for all direct and indirect effects). Overall,
the full model accounted for about 56% of the variance in Muslim surveillance policy
support (r2 = .56; see Figure 14 for all significant direct effects; see Table 9 for a
summary of hypothesis support for all models).
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Table 9
Summary of Hypothesis Support
Hypothesis

Conclusion

Summary
Realistic threat perceptions mediated the
relationship between SDO and IS, but
symbolic threat perceptions were a stronger
mediator of this relationship

1a (SDO > Real > IS)

Partially Supported

1b (RWA > Sym > IS)

Fully Supported

Symbolic threat perceptions mediated the
relationship between RWA and IS better than
realistic or terroristic threat perceptions

1c (NAT > Terr > IS)

Partially Supported

Terroristic threat perceptions mediated the
relationship between NAT and IS, but
symbolic and realistic threat perceptions were
stronger mediators of this relationship

1d (Real/Sym/Terr > IS > Policy)

Fully Supported

IS mediated the relationships between realistic,
symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions and
anti-Muslim policy support

Exploratory Hypothesis (Emotion Clusters)

Unsupported

2a (Real > Anger)

Partially Supported

Realistic threat perceptions predicted anger,
but symbolic threat perceptions were a better
predictor of anger

2b (Sym > Distrust)

Fully Supported

Symbolic threat perceptions predicted distrust
better than realistic or terroristic threat
perceptions

2c (Terr > Fear)

Partially Supported

Terroristic threat perceptions predicted fear,
but symbolic threat perceptions were a better
predictor of fear

Partially Supported

Realistic threat perceptions predicted anger and
anti-Muslim policy support, but symbolic
threat perceptions were a better predictor of
anger and anger did not mediate the
relationships between perceived threats and
anti-Muslim policy support

Partially Supported

Symbolic threat perceptions predicted distrust
more than realistic or terroristic threat
perceptions and anti-Muslim policy support,
but distrust did not mediate the relationships
between perceived threats and anti-Muslim
policy support

Partially Supported

Terroristic threat perceptions predicted fear,
but did not predict anti-Muslim policy support
and fear was better predicted by symbolic
threat perceptions but did not mediate the
relationships between perceived threats and
anti-Muslim policy support

3a (Real > Anger > Policy)

3b (Sym > Distrust > Policy)

3c (Terr > Fear > Policy)

Cluster analyses failed to reveal conclusive
clusters of distinct emotional reactions

Note. Real = Realistic Threat Perceptions, Sym = Symbolic Threat Perceptions, Terr = Terroristic Threat
Perceptions, IS = Islamophobia, NAT = Nationalism
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Discussion
The current study elucidates the roles of several individual differences in ideology
and threat perceptions in predicting anti-Muslim attitudes and policy support. Overall, the
current study provides partial support for several of the hypotheses and reveals important
insights for future research aimed at understanding threat-based emotional reactions. Aim
1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) focused on the role of threat perceptions in driving the relationships
between individual differences in ideology and anti-Muslim attitudes and policy,
representing an ideology-threat-attitude-behavior model of anti-Muslim bias. The results
of the SEM for aim 1 suggest that SDO, RWA, and Nationalism simultaneously predicted
Islamophobia through perceived realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threats. These
increases in Islamophobic attitudes also helped to explain the relationships between each
type of threat perception and anti-Muslim policy support, such as the Muslim ban.
Contrary to the expectation that each ideological difference would be most related to
conceptually similar types of threat (i.e., SDO/realistic, RWA/symbolic,
Nationalism/terroristic), it appeared that symbolic threat perceptions were the strongest
predictor and mediator of anti-Muslim attitudes and subsequent policy support. This
indirect effect appears to be driven by the particularly strong relationship between
symbolic threats and Islamophobia as the pattern of relationships between each ideology
and each threat perception was consistent with expectations (i.e., that SDO would best
predict realistic threats, RWA would best predict symbolic threats, and Nationalism
would best predict terroristic threats). The indirect effects of each type of perceived threat
did not vary substantially in size from each predictor to Islamophobia, however, making
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it unclear how practically meaningful these differences are. Despite these unexpected
findings, the overall pattern of results revealed that several related, but distinct individual
differences in ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, Nationalism) help to explain increases in
participants’ anti-Muslim attitudes and policy support and that they do so through several
types of perceived threats related to resources, values, and safety.
Aim 2 (exploratory hypothesis and hypotheses 2a-2c) focused on evaluating the
emotional components of each type of threat perception, including the more recent
addition of terroristic threat perceptions within the intergroup threat theory framework.
Findings from aim 2 provided insights about the emotional components of perceived
threats that will be important for future research in this area. Results of the k-means and
hierarchical cluster analyses were inconclusive which led to the testing of hypotheses 2a2c as part of an a priori analysis contingency plan. Instead of utilizing emotion clusters in
regression analyses, this contingency plan relied on existing theory which suggests that
anger tends to be representative of realistic threats (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), distrust
tends to be representative of symbolic threats (Gervais et al., 2011), and fear tends to be
representative of terroristic threats (Lerner et al., 2003). Nine separate regression analyses
were run with each type of perceived threat predicting each emotion in order to compare
model fit and determine which type of threat perception best predicted anger, distrust,
and fear. Results indicated that each type of perceived threat predicted anger, distrust, and
fear when entered separately into a regression analysis. Symbolic threat perceptions
accounted for the most variance in each emotion but the difference in effect sizes
between symbolic threat perceptions and the other two types of perceived threats were

MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY

97

small. BIC comparisons also suggested that symbolic threat perceptions were the best
predictor of anger, distrust, and fear compared to realistic and terroristic threat
perceptions. Together, these findings suggest that there is likely overlap in which types of
perceived threats elicit which emotional responses and possibly that symbolic threat
perceptions are more likely to elicit various emotional responses, in general.
Aim 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c) focused on evaluating the mediating roles of distinct
emotions in the relationships between each type of perceived threat and support for
increased surveillance of Muslims by law enforcement. Findings from aim 3 were largely
unsupported. The SEM simultaneously examined whether threat-based emotions
mediated the relationships between distinct types of perceived threats and anti-Muslim
policy support. Realistic and symbolic threat perceptions directly predicted support for an
anti-Muslim policy, but terroristic threat perceptions did not. This is somewhat consistent
with findings from aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) that the direct effects between symbolic and
terroristic threats and anti-Muslim policy support were not significant when accounting
for the indirect effect of Islamophobia in these relationships. Although realistic,
symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions predicted anger, distrust, and fear, these
emotional reactions did not mediate the relationships between perceived threats and antiMuslim policy support. Still, this analysis provided additional insights for future research
beyond those of aim 2. Specifically, results showed that symbolic threat perceptions most
strongly predicted fear, distrust, and anger while simultaneously accounting for the
relationships between symbolic, realistic, and terroristic threat perceptions and each
emotion. This provides further support to the notion that symbolic threat perceptions may
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be particularly important in driving emotional reactions compared to realistic and
terroristic threat perceptions. The nonsignificant mediating effects of emotional reactions
in the relationships between perceived threats and policy support are somewhat
inconsistent with previous work (e.g., Wirtz et al., 2015), however, and require further
investigation in future studies. Possible reasons for the nonsignificant results obtained are
discussed below.
Implications
The findings of the current study contribute to our understanding of the roles of
individual differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and emotions in prejudice and
discrimination toward Muslims in the United States in several ways. Findings from the
first aim suggest that differences in ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, and Nationalism) predict
different types of perceived threats (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic) which then
influence support for anti-Muslim policies through Islamophobia. This work builds on
past research suggesting that SDO is a predictor of Islamophobia and that realistic,
symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions each mediate this relationship (Uenal, 2016)
by incorporating two other individual difference variables (i.e., RWA and Nationalism)
that are more conceptually related to symbolic and terroristic threats, respectively.
Despite a few deviations from expectations, these findings help to disentangle the
independent roles of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism as predictors of Islamophobia through
realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions by simultaneously testing all of these
relationships. Similarly, these findings point to the independent role of each type of threat
perception as predictors of anti-Muslim policy support through Islamophobia, suggesting
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that threat perceptions not only impact intergroup attitudes but that these intergroup
attitudes also influence behavioral intentions. This may have important implications for
understanding which individuals, such as those high in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism,
will be prone to perceive Muslims as threatening and how these perceptions of threat will
impact intergroup relations. Although longer-term, experimental designs would be
needed to further understand the cause and effect of the established relationships, these
findings suggest that those who are higher in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism will be more
likely to perceive Muslims as realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threats, broadly, which
impact Islamophobia attitudes and anti-Muslim policy support.
Understanding which types of people are more likely to perceive certain types of
threats holds implications for future research aimed at political messaging regarding
active policy issues. Specifically, it may be useful to consider how the framing of policy
initiatives differentially influences support by those who are higher in each of these
individual differences. If proponents of policies, such as increased surveillance of
Muslims, use stereotypes about Muslims as terrorists to justify their arguments, then
those higher in certain ideologies, such as SDO or RWA, may be more likely to support
these policies and politicians whose goals align with perceived threat reduction. Other
evidence for these relationships exists with several studies pointing to RWA and SDO as
predictors of support for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential election (e.g., Craig &
Richeson, 2014b, Womick et al., 2018) as well as the mediating role perceived realistic
threat on support for Trump and anti-immigrant policies, such as the Muslim ban (Major
et al., 2018; Osborn et al., 2019). Despite a lack of evidence that wide-sweeping policies
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that reduce immigration of Muslims promote national safety (Ali, 2016; Elsheikh et al.,
2017), politicians like Donald Trump have been successful at garnering support for these
kinds of harsh policies that disproportionately impact immigrants from Muslim-majority
countries (Trump, 2017b) by building a base of supporters who, based on the findings of
this and other studies, are more likely to perceive certain groups as threatening to their
resources, values, and safety. In the case of Muslims, this heightened sensitivity to
perceived threats leads to higher levels of Islamophobia and support for anti-Muslim
policies such as the Muslim ban.
The second aim of the current study attempted to build on previous research that
has explored the emotional components of realistic and symbolic threats by incorporating
the recent addition of terroristic threats to intergroup threat theory (Obaidi et al., 2018;
Uenal, 2016). In earlier conceptions of this theory, realistic threats encompassed both
resource and safety threats. The current study followed research that suggests that
resource and safety threats are conceptually different, and thus, should be investigated as
distinct types of threat perceptions (Crawford, 2014; Uenal, 2016) and reassessed the
emotional components of these threats under this new framework. Although the
exploratory hypothesis and hypotheses 2a-2c were largely unsupported, these findings
provide insight into how threat perceptions and emotions are related which will be
important for future research. Specifically, symbolic threat perceptions were a better
predictor of several distinct emotions (i.e., anger, distrust, fear) compared to realistic and
terroristic threat perceptions. Although the differences in the effect of each type of threat
perception on each emotion were relatively small, these findings suggest that threats to
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one’s values may be more likely to elicit emotional responses, in general. This may be
due to the importance of personal values in one’s social identity which value-violating
groups may be perceived to threaten (Rios et al., 2018). Thus, perceived threats to one’s
social identity may be tied to more emotional responses compared to threats to one’s
resources or safety. Future research would need to directly test these possibilities,
however.
Finally, the third aim of this study builds on previous research investigating
predictors of attitudes toward Muslims and support for policy initiatives that have realworld impacts on Muslims living in the United States, such as a Muslim ban or increasing
the surveillance of Muslims in the United States. Specifically, extending on work
suggesting that threat perceptions influence support for discriminatory, group-based
policies (e.g., Mukherjee et al., 2013; Rios et al., 2018; Stephan et al., 2015), the third
aim of this study was to elucidate the role of emotions in support for anti-Muslim policies
by investigating the mediational role of threat-based emotional reactions. Similar to
hypotheses 2a-2c, hypotheses 3a-3c were largely unsupported and suggested the same
pattern of findings that symbolic threat perceptions best predicted each emotional
reaction compared to realistic and terroristic threat perceptions even when simultaneously
estimated, lending more evidence that symbolic threat perceptions may be particularly
important in guiding emotional reactions. Although each type of perceived threat
predicted anger, distrust, and fear, these emotional reactions did not predict nor mediate
the relationships between each type of perceived threat and support for increased police
surveillance of Muslims in the United States. The findings from aims 2 and 3 are
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inconsistent with previous work suggesting that discrete emotions predict policy support
(Lerner et al., 2003) and mediate the relationships between perceived threat and policy
support (Wirtz et al., 2015).
One possibility for this inconsistency may be the general and explicit nature of the
emotion measures used. Average ratings on each emotional reaction item were well
below the midpoint on the scale, suggesting that most participants did not highly endorse
experiencing these emotional reactions when thinking about Muslims, in general.
Previous research implicating the roles of discrete emotions in support for anti-Muslim
policies, however, have often used more contextualized measures of emotions or
experimentally induced certain emotions (Lerner et al., 2003). Thus, it may be that asking
participants their broad emotional reactions to a specific group that they may or may not
regularly interact with led to the low endorsement of any specific emotion. Still, the
findings that almost every type of perceived threat predicted anger, distrust, and fear 4
may hold implications for future research exploring the use of threat- or emotion-based
language in policy proposals. For example, much of the language used in President
Trump’s Muslim Ban focused on the impending threat that outside terrorists pose to
Americans while targeting Muslim-majority countries (Trump, 2017a; Trump, 2017b).
The use of such fear-based language and reliance on stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists
likely influenced both other politician’s and the public’s support for this policy. Future
research may build on these findings in order to better understand how emotionally

4

Exceptions to this pattern include the nonsignificant effect of realistic threat perceptions on distrust and
the nonsignificant effect of terroristic threat perceptions on anger.
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charged language shifts how people think about, perceive, and subsequently support
different policy initiatives which can have far-reaching and negative impacts.
Applied Implications and Interventions
Although this work did not directly test any applied practices or interventions, the
findings may help inform real-world applications. Given that the outcomes of interest in
this study revolved around policies that hold implications for the policing of Muslims,
this study may have important implications for understanding the experiences of Muslims
with law enforcement in the United States. Research suggests that police officers have
higher levels of certain ideologies, such as SDO (Sidanius et al., 1994), which, based on
the findings of the current study, could influence their threat perceptions and attitudes
toward Muslims. It is important to understand police officers’ perceptions of Muslims
given increases in Muslim surveillance by police officers, and thus, increased contact
between these two groups. To better understand police officers’ perceptions of Muslims
and how this impacts policing of these communities, future research could investigate
whether police officers higher in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism are more likely to
perceive Muslims as threatening or endorse stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists. Such
research could also utilize actual policing outcomes, rather than policy support, perhaps
focusing on outcomes relevant to surveilling, such as increased contact without arrest or
time spent monitoring areas with known mosques and Muslim community centers. This
would allow for more insight into the impacts of attitudes and threat perceptions on actual
Muslim surveillance by police that has resulted from policy implementation (e.g., Patriot
Act).
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This research may also have implications for how policy proposals and bills are
drafted and evaluated prior to bringing them to a vote. Given ideological differences such
as SDO and RWA may influence susceptibility to perceive Muslims as threatening, it
may be that politicians who are higher in these ideologies will be more likely to perceive
Muslims as threatening which could impact how they write policy proposals and frame
their arguments. Further, because Muslims tend to be overrepresented in media reporting
of terrorism (Kearns et al., 2019b) and stereotyped as terrorists (Ekman, 2015), perceived
threats of this group may be particularly problematic for policy decisions. Based on these
considerations, one potential policy implication from the current study might be to
employ objective, non-partisan policy proposal evaluators to assess whether the claims
and justifications for new policies (and particularly those that could have consequential
impacts on specific groups) are based in evidence of actual potential threats rather than
perceptions of threats largely based in stereotypes. Such a process would allow for a
more objective, third-party view of new issues before formally bringing them into
political discourse and would help ensure that political issues being debated and voted on
are based on evidence and facts as much as possible.
Limitations and Considerations
As with all psychological research, important considerations when interpreting the
findings are the social and historical contexts in which the data were collected. During
participant recruitment, the United States and the world had been dealing with the effects
of the COVID-19 pandemic for the better part of a year. Not only did this result in all
participant interactions occurring online, making it hard to control for external
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distractions while participants completed the survey, but participants may have been
handling a number of additional life stressors brought on by the pandemic (e.g., job loss,
illness) that may have impacted attention. An attention check item was used to remove
participants who did not pay attention to the survey instructions to attend to this
possibility. During this time, there was also an emphasis on the Black Lives Matter
movement as protests erupted across the United States in response to several fatal police
shootings involving unarmed Black people. This may have impacted the salience of the
importance of social justice and group-based equity, especially for liberal participants
who tend to be lower in ideological beliefs like SDO and RWA (Wilson & Sibley, 2013)
and support more egalitarian policies (Pratto et al., 1994). Finally, data collection
occurred during the months leading up to the 2020 presidential election involving thenPresident Trump who initiated and signed the Muslim ban into effect in 2017 (Trump,
2017b). Although controversial as a President and candidate, no known major actions or
events specific to the Muslim ban or related issues occurred within the Trump
administration during the time of data collection. Although it is unlikely that any of these
social or historical factors meaningful impacted the relationships examined in the current
study, it is important to consider the findings within this context. For example, COVID19 has been shown to increase perceptions of threat and intergroup intolerance in general
(Van Bavel et al., 2020), an effect which could have generalized to participants’
susceptibility to perceive Muslims as threats. Similarly, it could be that the societal
emphasis on group-based equity in policing impacted intergroup attitudes toward
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multiple minority groups who may experience disproportionate attention and force from
law enforcement.
As with any study, there are also several limitations of the current investigation.
One limitation of the current study is the correlational nature of non-experimental survey
data. Although SEM allows for causal inference, these techniques do not replace
experimental manipulation or longitudinal approaches in terms of determining causality.
Thus, in order to establish the robustness of the current study’s findings, implementing an
experimental or longitudinal approach would be an important next step. For example,
future work could manipulate the salience of specific types of threats by Muslims to
determine whether priming threat perceptions systematically leads to more or less support
of discriminatory policies for those who are high in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism
compared to those who are low in these ideologies to better understand how different
types of threat perceptions are related and interact.
The nature of the measures used in this study also presents a limitation in that
they are self-reported and explicit. As such, these measures may be susceptible to social
desirability which appeared to be the case based on the low means for each measure.
Although averages on each measure were similar to those from other studies using these
measures, the fact that social desirability may have been suppressing the true level of
each attitude presents a limitation to our ability to identify the relationships of interest.
Explicit measures may also be inappropriate for the nature of some of the measures used,
such as emotions, which occur in response to specific contexts or situations and often
occur outside of our conscious awareness. This limitation hints at a larger limitation of
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the current study design. Specifically, this study only uses explicit measures of attitudes
and perceptions, which may paint a modest picture of the phenomena of interest.
Specifically, because attitudes and perceptions occur at both explicit and implicit levels
(e.g., Devine, 1989; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), measuring each emotion in an explicit
way limits our understanding to what participants are able and willing to report.
Participants may not be consciously aware of which emotions they feel in response to
Muslims, making it difficult for them to report these feelings, and difficult for the current
study to illuminate the role of these emotions in support for anti-Muslim policies. Future
work should aim to address this limitation through the use of implicit measures of bias
toward Muslims that are more contextually bound to a specific event or situation. Implicit
measures could come in many forms, including video face-reading technology (e.g.,
Noldus FaceReader Software) in order to measure emotional responses to stimuli
intended to manipulate perceived threat (e.g., Muslims vs non-Muslims in an airport
setting). Although positive emotions were excluded from the current study due to the
study’s focus on inherently negative types of perceived threat, this type of work would
allow for easy inclusion of positive emotions as this technology provides continuous
measures of positive, negative, and neutral emotions, allowing for a relative comparison
of simultaneous positive and negative expressions.
The last limitation of this study that is important to consider is that the measures
of social attitudes, threat perceptions, and emotional reactions toward Muslims were not
contextually bound, meaning that they are assessing each construct at a general level
without a specific context. This limits our understanding of how these factors may
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interact and influence each other in different ways depending on the situational context at
hand. Given research that suggests that several of the variables of interest may be more or
less important for predicting outcomes based on the context (e.g., individual differences
in ideology, threat perceptions), exploring the influence of these factors in different
contexts is important (e.g., Rios et al., 2018). As mentioned briefly above, emotional
reactions are typically elicited by specific situations or stimuli, limiting the ability of the
emotion measures used in this study to explain the broad relationships of interest. In
thinking of the stronger impact of symbolic threats, it may be that symbolic threats are
particularly salient for Muslims in the absence of other contextual cues. For example, it
may be that Muslims encountered in airports will be perceived more as terroristic threats
whereas Muslims encountered walking down the street will be perceived more as
symbolic threats. Future work could address this limitation by orienting the situational
context around the specific outcome variable in question. For example, if the relationship
of interest is whether fear mediates the relationship between terroristic threat perceptions
and increased support for police surveillance of Muslims, it may be relevant to
manipulate terroristic threats by having some participants read about the attacks of 9/11
before answering questions about their attitudes toward Muslims and support for antiMuslim policies. Focusing future research on specific contexts, rather than taking a more
general approach as the current study did, will be helpful in better understanding the
impact of terrorism stereotypes about Muslims that are largely driven by media on
subsequent support for discriminatory policies that directly impact Muslims in the United
States.
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Future Directions
Future exploration of this work will include the consideration of theoretically
plausible alternative structural equation models, particularly for aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-1d)
which provided support for an ideology-threat-attitude-behavior model of anti-Muslim
bias. Although this model fits well into the intergroup threat theory framework (e.g.,
Stephen et al., 2015), this theory reflects some flexibility in the direction of relationships
between attitudes, threat perceptions, and behaviors. First, an alternative model in which
the direction of relationships between each type of perceived threat and Islamophobia is
reversed (i.e., an ideology-attitude-threat-behavior model of anti-Muslim bias) will be
tested and compared to the hypothesized model for aim 1 with the plan of identifying a
superior model which will be transparently prepared for publication. Another potential
avenue could be to investigate the roles of specific facets of Islamophobia on support for
different types of anti-Muslim policies. As previously described, Islamophobia consists
of both an anti-Muslim and anti-Islam component (Uenal, 2016). This type of distinction
may be important in determining how Islamophobia may differentially contribute to
support for policies that specifically target members of a religious group compared to
those that target broader religious beliefs or a religious doctrine. For example, it may be
that support for policies that impact individual Muslims, such as surveillance by law
enforcement, will be most predicted by the anti-Muslim facet of Islamophobia, whereas
support for policies aimed at reducing the influence of Islam on American society, such
as a Muslim ban, will be most predicted by the anti-Islam facet of Islamophobia.
Similarly, alternative models could assess whether different types of perceived threats
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predict different types of policies (e.g., Muslim ban vs Muslim enrollment limits at
American universities). For instance, if terroristic threats predict support for a Muslim
ban better than symbolic threats, this may allow for more targeted intervention to break
down stereotypes and misinformation that are relevant for terroristic threat perceptions,
specifically. Both of these approaches would require the separation of the aggregated
anti-Muslim policy support items used to address aim 1, however, and may not be as
easily compared to the originally hypothesized model due to these changes in
measurement.
Future research should also aim to examine the potential interactive effects of
individual differences on the relationships between ideology, threat perceptions, and
policy support. Although political orientation was used as a covariate in the current
models, it may be that political ideology actually moderates the relationships between
perceived threats and Islamophobia. The role of political orientation could be further
explored using multigroup modeling to determine whether political orientation changes
the pattern or strength of the mediational effects. Additionally, some research has
suggested that ideologies such as SDO and RWA can have additive and interactive
effects on intergroup attitudes (e.g., Wilson & Sibley, 2013), something which was not
explored in the hypothesized models. Although the current study points to an independent
and additive effect of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism on perceived threats and anti-Muslim
attitudes, it could be that these ideologies also interact in various ways to change the
nature or strength of the indirect effects of perceived threats on anti-Muslim policy
support. Although adding several interaction terms to the already complex hypothesized
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model may make the interpretation of the effects difficult, smaller alternative models
could be run to investigate the interactive effects of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism on
each type of perceived threat and anti-Muslim attitudes individually to get a fuller idea of
the impact of multiple ideologies on anti-Muslim policy support.
To better understand the inconclusive results of aims 2 (exploratory hypothesis
and hypotheses 2a-2c) and 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c), alternative models that test whether the
direction of relationships between threat perceptions and emotions should be reversed
will also be tested. Although less theoretically conventional, it could be that emotional
reactions are used as indicators of the type of threat perceived in a given situation (i.e., an
emotion-threat-behavior model of anti-Muslim bias). Results will be compared to the
hypothesized models, however, based on the low power for SEM 2, a larger sample size
may be needed to better understand these relationships. Comparisons of alternative
models such as those proposed above are typical in SEM due to the fact that for any good
fitting model, there is an infinite number of equally good fitting models. It should be
noted, however, that any alternative models showing a better fit to the data would need to
be retested in an independent sample to avoid the possibility of capitalizing on chance
with post hoc analyses.
Another area for future research lies in the measurement of actual behavioral
outcomes (e.g., signing a petition to promote the signing of a policy into law) rather than
the behavioral intentions used in the current study (i.e., self-reported policy support).
Although reported support for policies should indicate the likelihood that one would
behave in accordance with this support when presented the opportunity, it does not
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necessarily translate to behavior, which may be influenced by several factors not
examined here (e.g., context, norms; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Future work should aim to
implement behavioral measures when possible. For example, one could present
participants with a number of fictitious petitions for new laws related to Muslim
surveillance as a measure of participant’s willingness to promote anti-Muslim policies
through their actions. Although participants would not be signing real petitions, this could
provide insight into the influence of individual differences in ideology, threat
perceptions, and emotional reactions in predicting discrimination against Muslims.
Another possibility that was previously mentioned would be to use actual policing data
specific to the policing of Muslims. Although data between law enforcement agencies is
not always standardized or complete, investigations could be conducted at a local or
organizational level when data is available to allow for a deeper understanding of the
actual impacts of identity-based policing on Muslims in the United States.
To further disentangle the relationships between perceived threats and emotions,
future work could utilize experimental methods to examine the impacts of priming
different types of threats toward Muslims on subsequent emotional reactions and support
for anti-Muslim policies. For example, by providing participants with a vignette or
supposed headline that primes threat of a realistic (e.g., “Muslims among highest wage
earners in the United States”), symbolic (e.g., “Americans are increasingly converting
from Christianity to Islam”), or terroristic (e.g., “Muslim terrorist attacks on the rise in
the United States”) nature, and then measuring their emotional responses and subsequent
support for policies that would hinder Muslims growth and development in American
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society, we may be able to better understand whether and how emotions impact relations
between perceived threats and policy. Another adaptation that could be implemented in
future work would be to measure emotions on a more implicit level (e.g., through face
reading technology) to better assess discrete emotional responses to differences in
perceived threat. Utilizing technology aimed at assessing smaller and less controllable
expressions of emotional change may be particularly beneficial to addressing the
potential for social desirability in intergroup bias research.
A final area for future research could be to explore how these effects translate to
prejudice toward other groups and subsequent policy support. Given that the scope of this
research was to investigate how different ideologies and perceptions influence policies
that specifically impact Muslims, it is unclear whether these mechanisms are unique to
Muslims or whether these effects would be stronger toward Muslims than other groups.
Moving forward, it would be beneficial to explore how the mechanisms of individual
differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and emotions function for other religious or
ethnic groups. Future research should investigate how individual differences in SDO,
RWA, and Nationalism impact perceptions of threat toward multiple religious and ethnic
groups, such as Jewish people or non-Muslim Middle Easterners. This would provide
insight on how generalizable the mechanisms examined in the current study are for other
groups of people and other types of policy support.
Conclusion
The current study contributes to our understanding of the simultaneous roles of
individual differences in ideology, threat perceptions, anti-Muslim attitudes, and
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emotions in support for anti-Muslim policies in the United States. Aim 1 (hypotheses 1a1d) evaluated an ideology-threat-attitude-behavior model of anti-Muslim bias that
simultaneously investigated the roles of ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, Nationalism), threat
perceptions (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic), and Islamophobia in predicting antiMuslim policy support. Findings suggested that each of these ideologies simultaneously
predict each type of perceived threat which then mediates the relationships between
ideology and Islamophobia and subsequent anti-Muslim policy support, with symbolic
threat perceptions having the largest effects on these relationships. This research sheds
light on the individual differences in threat perceptions, and thus, the types of people who
may be more attuned to different types of threats. This study also provided some
considerations for future research regarding the emotional components of each threat
perception. Aim 2 (exploratory hypothesis and hypotheses 2a-2c) evaluated the emotional
components of perceived threats and provided important insights for future research
regarding the overlap in emotional representations of each type of perceived threat as
well as the importance of symbolic threat perceptions in eliciting various discrete
emotions. Aim 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c) evaluated the mediating roles of distinct emotions in
the relationships between different types of perceived threats and support for increased
surveillance of Muslims by law enforcement. Although expectations regarding the
mediations were unsupported, findings provided additional information for future
research that extends on those from aim 2. That is, just as symbolic threat perceptions
appeared to be the best predictor of each type of emotion when tested separately, this
pattern held when simultaneously accounting for the relationships between each type of
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perceived threat and each discrete emotional reaction. Altogether, this study suggests that
those higher in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism are more likely to perceive Muslims as
realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threats which increase their feelings of Islamophobia
and support for anti-Muslim policies. This has implications for who may be more or less
likely to vote against the interests of Muslims in the United States and guides future work
exploring how to minimize reliance on perceived threat and emotional reactions in policy
decisions. Further, this study points to the importance of symbolic threat perceptions in
mediating the relationships between each ideological difference and anti-Muslim
attitudes and policy support which may suggest that –at least in the absence of other
contextual cues—symbolic threat perceptions of Muslims are particularly important for
predicting Islamophobia, negative emotions, and anti-Muslim policy support. Although
the roles of emotions in the relationships between perceived threats and anti-Muslim
policy support were less clear in the current study, this work helps to inform future
research interested in the emotional components of threat perceptions of Muslims by also
pointing to the importance of symbolic threats for negative emotional reactions toward
Muslims. Ultimately, this study supports much of the existing literature on individual
differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and anti-Muslim attitudes while providing
several compelling areas of future research.
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Appendix: Survey Materials
1. Age
a. What is your age? __________
2. Urbanicity
a. What best describes the area you live in?
i. Urban
ii. Suburban
iii. Rural
iv. Other (Please specify: __________)
3. State of Residence
a. What state do you currently reside in? _______________________
4. Socioeconomic Status (SES)
a. Please estimate your socioeconomic status.
i. Very high
ii. High
iii. Somewhat high
iv. Average
v. Somewhat low
vi. Low
vii. Very low
5. Profession/Occupation
a. What is your current profession/occupation? _______________________
6. Education Level
a. What is your highest level of education?
i. Less than high school degree
ii. High school graduate
iii. Some college
iv. Bachelor’s degree
v. Graduate or professional degree
7. Race/Ethnicity
a. With which racial/ethnic group do you identify?
i. White, European
ii. Black, African
iii. Native American, First Nations
iv. Latino/a/x
v. East, South, or Southeast Asian
vi. Middle Eastern, Arab
vii. Hawaiian Native, Pacific Islander
viii. Multiracial (Please specify :_________)
ix. Not listed (Please specify :_________)
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8. Gender
a. With what gender do you identify?
i. Woman
ii. Man
iii. Non-Binary
iv. Not listed (Please specify :_________)
b. Do you identify as transgender?
i. Yes
ii. No
iii. Unsure
9. U.S. Native
a. Were you born in the United States?
i. Yes
ii. No (if no: how many years have you lived in the US: _________)
10. Political Ideology
a. Which of the following best represents your political views?
i. Very conservative
ii. Conservative
iii. Slightly conservative
iv. Neither liberal or conservative (please specify:_____________)
v. Slightly liberal
vi. Liberal
vii. Very liberal
11. Religious Identification
a. What is your religious identity?
i. Agnostic
ii. Atheist
iii. Buddhist
iv. Catholic
v. Christian
vi. Hindu
vii. Jewish
viii. Muslim
ix. None/No religious affiliation
x. Not listed (Please specify :_________)
12. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO7; Ho et al., 2015).
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below. You can
work quickly; your first feeling is generally best: 1 (strongly disagree) - 7
(strongly agree). R = reverse scored.
i. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be
on the bottom.
ii. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
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Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top. R
No one group should dominate in society. R
It is unjust to try to make groups equal.
Group equality should not be our primary goal.
We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. R
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different
groups. R
13. Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 2007)
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree). R = reverse scored.
i. Authoritarian aggression and submission subscale:
1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do
what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and
sinfulness that are ruining us.
2. The majority of those who criticize proper authorities in
government and religion only create useless doubts in
people’s minds.
3. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the
strongest method would be justified if they eliminated
troublemakers and got us back to our true path.
4. What our country really needs instead of more “civil
rights” is a good stiff dose of law and order.
5. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important
values children should learn.
6. The fact on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public
disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant
groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral
standards and preserve law and order.
7. What our country needs most is disciplined citizens,
following national leaders in unity.
ii. Conservatism subscale:
1. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the
established religions are no doubt every bit as good and
virtuous as those who attend church regularly. R
2. A lot of our rules regarding sexual behavior are just
customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than
those which other people follow. R
3. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. R
4. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being
brave enough to defy “traditional family values.” R
5. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs,
and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different
from everyone else. R

MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY

136

6. People should pay less attention to the Church and the
Pope, and instead develop their own personal standards of
what is moral and immoral. R
7. It is good that nowadays young people have greater
freedom ‘‘to make their own rules’’ and to protest against
things they don’t like. R
14. Nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989)
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree).
i. In view of America's moral and material superiority, it is only right
that we should have the biggest say in deciding United Nations
policy.
ii. The first duty of every young American is to honor the national
American history and heritage.
iii. The important thing for the U.S. foreign aid program is to see to it
that the U.S. gains a political advantage.
iv. Other countries should try to make their government as much like
ours as possible.
v. Generally, the more influence America has on other nations, the
better off they are.
vi. Foreign nations have done some very fine things, but it takes
America to do things in a big way.
vii. It is important that the U.S. win in international sporting
competitions like the Olympics.
viii. It is really not important that the U.S. be number one in whatever it
does. R
15. Threat perceptions (adapted from Uenal, 2016)
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree).
i. Realistic Threat:
1. The presence of Islam in the United States threatens our
economic prosperity.
2. Because of the presence of Islam, the education system in
the United States is threatened.
3. Because of the presence of Muslims in the United States,
Americans have more difficulties finding a job.
4. Because of the presence of Muslims in the United States,
Americans have more difficulties finding housing.
ii. Symbolic Threat:
1. I am worried that the Western culture is endangered by
Islam.
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2. I am worried that the Christian norms and values are
threatened by Islam.
3. I am worried that the American norms and values are
threatened by the presence of Muslims.
4. I am worried that our rights and freedom are threatened by
the presence of Muslims.
iii. Terroristic Threat:
1. I am worried that peace is threatened by radical Islamist
groups in the United States.
2. It is only a matter of time before the United States will
become a target for Islamist terrorists.
3. Sometimes I think I could become a victim of an Islamist
terrorist attack myself.
16. Islamophobia (Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2013)
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree).
i. I would support any policy that would stop the building of new
mosques (Muslim place of worship) in the U.S.
ii. If possible, I would avoid going to places where Muslims would
be.
iii. I would become extremely uncomfortable speaking with a Muslim.
iv. Just to be safe, it is important to stay away from places where
Muslims could be.
v. I dread the thought of having a professor that is Muslim.
vi. If I could, I would avoid contact with Muslims.
vii. If I could, I would live in a place where there were no Muslims.
viii. Muslims should not be allowed to work in places where many
Americans gather such as airports.
ix. Islam is a dangerous religion.
x. The religion of Islam supports acts of violence.
xi. Islam supports terrorist acts.
xii. Islam is anti-American.
xiii. Islam is an evil religion.
xiv. Islam is a religion of hate.
xv. I believe that Muslims support the killings of all non-Muslims.
xvi. Muslims want to take over the world.
17. Emotional reactions (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005)
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement
below by selecting a number from 1 to 5 on the scale below: 1 (not at all) 7 (extremely).
i. When I think about Muslims I feel…
1. Fear
2. Anger
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3. Distrust
4. Disgust
5. Anxiety
6. Pity
7. Guilt
8. Envy
18. Policy Support (Items 1 and 2 self-created; item 3 from Nobles & Nobles,
1954, as cited in Andersen, Brinson, & Stohl, 2012)
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree).
i. I would support a policy to require government surveillance of all
U.S. mosques.
ii. I would support the banning of all Muslims into the United States.
iii. I would support state universities limiting enrollment by members
of racial and religious groups in proportion to their percentage of
the state’s population.
19. Summary of “Proposed” Muslim Surveillance Program in United States
a. A Senate bill which calls for increased police surveillance of Muslims was
recently scheduled for a vote. The Surveillance for Public Safety Act (S.B.
5483) would enable increased police surveillance of Muslims and their
communities in the United States with the goal of preventing domestic
terrorism. If passed, this bill would then go to a conference committee for
final approval before being sent to the President for signing. If signed by
the President, this law would allow police officers and law enforcement
agencies to stop and request information from individuals seen leaving a
mosque or Islamic community center regarding their identity, reason for
visiting the mosque or community center, and other pertinent information
that law enforcement officials deem useful in preventing terrorism in the
United States as long as they have reasonable suspicion. Supporters of this
bill cite the importance of understanding who is visiting mosques and why
in relation to the war on terror in the United States. Providing police
officers this extra allowance to question those visiting mosques aids in this
effort. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that “reasonable suspicion” is
vague and allows for undue questioning of those who are practicing their
religious freedoms in the United States.
20. Support for “Proposed” Muslim Surveillance Program in United States
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree).
i. I would support the decision to pass this bill to increase police
surveillance of Muslim communities and mosques.
ii. Having increased police surveillance of Muslim communities and
mosques through this bill would reduce crime in the United States.
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iii. The passing of this bill would make the United States safer.
iv. The passing of this bill would increase racial profiling in the
United States. R
v. The passing of this bill would increase religious profiling in the
United States. R
vi. Increasing Muslim surveillance through this bill would have a
negative impact on Muslim-police interactions. R
vii. Passing this bill would have a negative impact on the lives of
Muslims in the United States. R
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